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Lorne Sossin* Salvaging the Welfare State?:
The Prospects for Judicial Review
of the Canada Health & Social
Transfer
The Canadian Health and Social Transfer ("CHST"), which came into force on
April 1, 1996, contains no national standards relating to the quality of social
welfare. The goal of this new transfer was to promote provincial flexibility in the
sphere of social policy. The author argues that this flexibility may undermine the
core of the Canadian welfare state. Given the preoccupation of the provincial and
federal governments with devolution, welfare recipients must turn to the judiciary
to determine the "bottom line" of the welfare state. The author explores the various
constitutional and administrative law grounds on which the federal government's
spending power under the CHST could be constrained. He concludes that while
judicial review may serve as a useful catalyst for reexamining the normative
foundation of the Canadian welfare state (as it arguably has in the U.S. context),
current administrative and constitutional jurisprudence make a successful chal-
lenge of the CHST unlikely.
Le transfert canadien en matiere de sant6 et de programmes sociaux ("CHST),
qui date du leravril 1998, ne contientpas de normes nationales quant la qualit6
de I'assistance sociale. Le but de ce nouveau transfert dtait de promouvoir la
flexibilit6 des provinces dans le domaine de la politique sociale. L'auteur
argumente que cette flexibilit6 pourrait 6branler I'essentiel de I'6tat de I'aide
sociale au Canada. Compte tenu de la pr6occupation des gouvernements
provincial et f6d6ral avec la d6centralisation, ceux qui vivent aux d6pens de I'etat
doivent recourir aux cours de justice pour d6terminer I'essentiel de I'dtat actuel
de I'aide sociale. L 'auteurexamine les divers motifs constitutionnels etadministratifs
sur lesquels le pouvoir de d6penser du gouvernement f~d6ral sous le CHST
pourrait 6tre contraint. Quoiqu'une enqudte judiciaire pourrait servir comme un
catalyseur pour r6examiner la base normative de I'6tat actuel de I'aide sociale
(comme a eu lieu aux -tats-Unis), I'auteur conclut que la jurisprudence admin-
istrative et constitutionnelle actuelle font qu'une contestation reussie du CHST
est peu probable.
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Everybody applauded that we were giving [the provinces] more freedom
and now the people say yeah but maybe we're giving them too much
freedom.
Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien'
Introduction
The Canadian welfare state is in a state of flux, buffeted by government
downsizing, deficit reduction, the devolution of powers to the provinces
and a growing ambivalence towards the role of the state in alleviating
poverty. As Tom Courchene bluntly concluded after reviewing recent
social policy developments, "there is no status quo."2 A number of
disquieting trends, however, are emerging. One of the most important of
these trends is the reduction of federal supervision over the content of
provincial welfare policy. This trend questions the very foundations of
the Canadian welfare state and its capacity to articulate shared norms
regarding the obligations of governments to citizens in need. This trend
is exemplified and extended by the federal government's enactment of
the Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which came into force
on April 1, 1996. 3
The CHST is a unilateral federal payment composed of cash and tax
points allocated to the provinces as a spending envelope covering health
care, post-secondary education and social welfare.4 The provinces may
choose to spend this fund in any proportion they wish as between these
1. Quoted in S. McCarthy,"PM Loath to Pay Provinces for Health Care" The [Toronto] Globe
& Mail (24 June 1998) A4.
2. TJ. Courchene, ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems,
Working Paper (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, 1996) [hereinafter
ACCESS] at 38.
3. The Budget Implementation Act 1995, S.C. 1995, c.17, s.48 [hereinafter Budget Act]
amended the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8 and
established the CHST as a block grant encompassing federal funding for health care and
post-secondary education, replacing the Established Programs Financing ("EPF") and
social assistance (replacing the Canada Assistance Plan R.S.C. 1985, c.c-I [hereinafter
CAP]). Section 32 of the Budget Act repeals CAP as of March 31,2000. For a review of
developments in EPF and CAP up to their repeal, see T. Courchene, Social Canada in
the Millennium: Reform Imperatives and Restructuring Principles (Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute, 1994) at 84-130 [hereinafter Social Canada]; and F. Vaillancourt, "Income
Distribution, Income Security and Fiscal Federalism" and S. Phillips, "Social Policy in
Winter" in K. Banting, D. Brown & T. Courchene, eds., The Future of Fiscal Federalism
(Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1994) 255,283; and P. Leslie,
"The Fiscal Crisis of Canadian Federalism" in P. Leslie et al., eds., A Partnership in
Trouble: Renegotiating Fiscal Federalism (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1993) 1.
4. A tax point is the amount of money yielded by I per cent of income tax revenue in the
province. In other words, if the federal government collected $1,000,000 in income tax revenue
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three areas. However, the provinces must comply with certain conditions
in order to be eligible to receive their full cash proportion of the funding.
The Canada Health Act conditions (public administration, comprehen-
siveness, universality, portability and accessibility) continue to apply to
the portion of the CHST used to fund health care. However, conditions
relating to welfare contained in the previous Canada Assistance Plan no
longer apply. In its place, the CHST contains only a single, national
standard applicable to provincial social assistance programs: no province
receiving the CHST may make a minimum residency period a pre-
requisite to eligibility for social assistance (the "residency requirement").
It is the removal of national standards from the substance of social
welfare that has been most controversial to social policy observers.5 My
primary concern regarding the CHST is its implications for the welfare
state, not its implications for the future of fiscal federalism (these are
interrelated but in my view distinct issues).
An ongoing program of general social assistance to those in need
constitutes the core of any welfare state - without this, the welfare state
loses its capacity to advance our political and social aspirations.6 I share
in Ontario, every tax point would be worth $10,000 to Ontario. If, the following year, the federal
government collected $1,500,000 in income tax revenue from Ontario, the value of the tax
point would increase to $15,000 for Ontario. When a tax point is transferred, the province is
permitted to retain a larger share of income tax collected by the federal government, but no
actual money changes hands between the governments.
5. A partial review of this literature would include C.M. Scott, "Covenant Constitutionalism
and the Canada Assistance Plan" (1995) 6 Constitutional Forum 79; M. Jackman, "Women and
the Canada Health and Social Transfer: Ensuring Gender Equality in Federal Welfare Reform"
(1996) 8 C.J.W.L. 371 at 375-83 [hereinafter "Women and the CHST"]; M. Mendelson,
Looking for Mr. Good-Transfer: A Guide to the CHSTNegotiations (Ottawa: Caledon Institute
of Social Policy, 1995) at 10-11; S. Torjman & K. Battle, Can We Have National Standards
(Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 1995); The Council of Canadians, Danger Ahead:
Assessing the Implications of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (Ottawa: The Council of
Canadians, 1995); Citizens for Public Justice, Will Ottawa Preserve National Equity?
(Toronto: Citizens for Public Justice, 1995); J. Rice,"Redesigning Welfare: The Abandonment
of a National Commitment," in S. Phillips, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1995-96 - Mid-Life Crisis
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995) 185; and S. Phillips, "The CHST: Fiscal Federalism
in Search of a Vision" in D. Brown & J. Rose, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1995) 65.
6. See R. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988) at 5. Keith Banting, in his comparative analysis of the
Canadian welfare state, observes,"[W]hile the particular form of income security varies from
nation to nation, it tends to cover a similar range of social needs, compensating for the loss of
earnings resulting from retirement, disability, sickness,and unemployment, supplementing the
incomes of families with children, and in some jurisdictions also augmenting the incomes of
low-wage earners. These programs represent one of the most important functions of govern-
ment,one with consequences for the well-being of millions of citizens, for the stability of social
relations, and for the legitimacy of the process of government itself." The Welfare State and
Canadian Federalism, 2nd ed. (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1987) at 2.
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with the drafters of the CHST the belief that the Canadian welfare state,
in order to thrive, must encourage provincial experimentation and inno-
vation in designing new social welfare strategies. However, this need not
alter the requirement that all provinces share a common "bottom line"
below which no citizen may fall. By virtue of the constitutional division
of powers in Canada, the only instruments through which the federal
government can establish and supervise such a "bottom line"in the area
of social welfare are conditional grants to the provinces. The federal
spending power has evolved as the means by which the federal govern-
ment expresses and enforces national standards in spheres under the
legislative competence of the provinces (health care being the most
familiar example).
The CHST currently contains no bottom line relating to national
welfare standards. It does provide, however, for a process through which
the federal government and the provinces may agree in the future to
shared principles and objectives to underlie social welfare programs. This
provision presupposes that no such shared principles and objectives
already exist and further that they may only be found through traditional
federalism mechanisms (i.e., annual meetings between provincial and
federal leaders). The purpose of this article is to question this presuppo-
sition. I suggest evidence of shared principles and objectives does indeed
already exist. These shared principles and objectives are reflected else-
where in our constitutional, poltical and legal traditions. Cumulatively,
they constitute the substantive foundation of the Canadian welfare state.
By removing any relationship between federal social funding and the
needs of economically vulnerable Canadians, the CHST denies to the
Canadian welfare state the social bond on which it was founded and
strengthened. The challenge, in order to salvage the welfare state, is to
restore and deepen this bond. I do not suggest that cooperative federalism
will not yield additional principles and objectives in relation to social
welfare. However, assuming this process stalls or fails, the federal
government, in disbursing and spending funds for social programs under
the CHST, should still be guided by those norms which already exist
elsewhere in our legal system.
Judicial review of the CHST would be a costly and uncertain undertak-
ing. Judicial review is a reactive mechanism. A government, group or
individual must first challenge the CHST or action taken under its
authority. Given scarce resources and no shortage of other battles in the
sphere of social welfare, actually launching litigation against the CHST
remains for now a remote prospect. While I conclude that judicial review
could serve as a crucial catalyst in the project to salvage the welfare state
in Canada, this is a role that thejudiciary has expressly eschewed in recent
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litigation. However, the Supreme Court has sent mixed signals respecting
the obligations of the state with respect to social welfare. I believe the
CHST provides a timely opportunity to examine the scope and nature of
the Canadian welfare state. In this sense, my project has two ambitions.
The first ambition is positive-to clarify what legal obligations, if any,
the federal government is under in its funding of social welfare in light of
the current administrative and constitutional jurisprudence. The second
ambition is normative-to argue that some legal obligation should exist
requiring the federal government to supervise the "bottom line" of the
welfare state through the exercise of its spending power.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part examines the CHST
and is divided into four sections. In the first section, I examine the
political and fiscal context in which the CHST emerged. In the second
section, I discuss how the CHST works and the limited discretion it
provides to the federal government to regulate provincial social pro-
grams. In the third section, I distinguish the CHST from the Canada
Assistance Plan which it replaces. Finally, in the fourth section, I review
the debate between the critics and the supporters as to the implications of
removing national standards from the CHST.
In the second part of the paper, I consider the potential of welfare
recipients to restore the norms underlying federal funding of social
assistance through judicial review of the CHST. This part is divided into
five sections. In the first section, I examine whether there is a basis in
administrative law to supervise how the federal government exercises its
spending power under the CHST. In the second section, I examine
whether there are grounds under sections 7 or 15 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms to guide the exercise of the federal spending power. In this
section, I consider the extent to which the courts' interpretation of
"rights" and the trend towards legislative deference insulates spending
programs such as the CHST from judicial intervention. In the third
section, I canvass the influence of constitutional provisions outside the
Charter, and specifically the commitment to provide essential services of
reasonable quality under s.36 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In the fourth
section, I consider the same question with respect to international law
obligations. In the fifth section, I analyze the impact of the rise and fall
of welfare rights in the U.S. on the emergence and implications of the
CHST. Finally, in the conclusion, I explore the "bottom-line" of welfare
state norms which ought to guide the federal government's spending
power under the CHST.
Ultimately, in my view, the welfare state ought to be about enforceable
social responsibilities rather than shifting fiscal arrangements. To wel-
fare recipients, which government provides a particular benefit or portion
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thereof is of little consequence next to the question of whether those
benefits are adequate to meet their basic needs. At its core, social welfare
is a normative project. Historically, in Canada, the popularity and justice
of this project has served as a catalyst for the federal and provincial
governments overcoming the strictures of federalism. Beginning with the
Rowell-Sirois Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1940, and
cemented through the subsequent constitutional agreement on unem-
ployment insurance, cooperative federalism and incremental constitu-
tional amendments provided the means for funding and administering the
welfare state.7 Among other accomplishments, these agreements paved
the way for the development of shared-cost programs and the advent of
national standards relating to the provision of social welfare. Fiscal
federalism, in this respect, evolved to meet the demand for more compre-
hensive welfare programs and thereby transformed Canada into some-
thing more than simply the sum of its parts. With the advent of the CHST,
the equation of the Canadian welfare state has been reversed. Now,
welfare legislation is devolving to meet the demands of fiscal federalism,
and as a result, welfare programs and benefits are steadily eroding in
name of provincial autonomy. As one judge observed, "[It must not be
blithely supposed that it is necessarily in the public interest to bleed those
who live at or below the poverty line as a purgative for social health, even
if the bleeding is only a little at a time and only once a month."' As a
consequence of the CHST, the capacity of the Canadian welfare state to
fulfill its purposes is in serious jeopardy.
1. The CHST
1. The Context of the CHST
The CHST was made possible and necessary because of two important
failures. The first was the rejection of the Charlottetown Accord. The
Accord would have put in place constitutional limits on federal spending
on social programs and a "social charter," paving the way for entrenching
broader and enforceable social rights in Canada.9 The social Charter was
7. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: The Com-
mission, 1940); see also D N. Smiley,Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism (Toronto:
Canada Tax Foundation, 1963).
8. Finlay v. Canada, [1990] 2 F.C. 790 at 816 (F.C.A.) MacGuigan J.
9. See J. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution: Perspectives
on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) [hereinafter Social
Justice and the Constitution]. See also M. Certosimo, "Does Canada Need a Social Charter?"
(1992) 15 Dalhousie L. J. 568; G. Brodksy, Social Charter Issues after Beaudoin-Dobbie
(Edmonton: Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta, 1992).
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advanced by the Ontario government in the Charlottetown negotiations
but was watered down to the point of representing little more than
entrenched "good intentions" by the time the agreement was put to the
people in the referendum of 1992.10 After the demise of the Charlottetown
Accord, it became clear that the constitutional route to social policy
reform had been foreclosed. Canadians were no longer in the mood for
another "mega-round" of constitutional negotiation. In its stead, some
initiative from the federal government was required to respond to the
demands of Quebec for more autonomy over social spending and to
reinvigorate federalism generally. The second failure which made the
CHST necessary was the consensus that there was a fiscal crisis in the
federal government in the early and mid-1990s. Redesigning social
transfers into a block grant would accommodate the need for greater
provincial autonomy while providing an opportunity to cap federal social
spending at a significantly reduced level. Thus, devolution represented a
mutually beneficial quidpro quo - the federal government ceded budget-
ary control over federal social funding to the provinces, who in turn
received greater autonomy in designing and funding social programs.'
2. The Anatomy of the CHST
The CHST is a block grant from the federal government to the provinces
consisting of both a cash payment and an allocation of tax points. The
value of this package is currently pegged at approximately 25 billion
dollars, although the federal government may unilaterally increase or
decrease the amount of the overall transfer. As tax points involve only a
notional transfer of funds-no money actually changes hands-this
component of the CHST will grow due to inflation and the increase in tax
revenues when the economy expands. The cash portion of the CHST
represents the difference between the overall ceiling and the value of the
allocated tax points .12 Therefore, the cash portion will begin to decrease
10. In Part 111.1, s. 36.1(2)(b) of the Accord, discussing the Social and Economic Union,
established as a "policy objective" the provision of "adequate social services and benefits to
ensure that all individuals resident in Canada have reasonable access to housing, food and other
basic necessities."
11. See E. Greenspon, "The New Federalism: Mother Ottawa cuts the apron strings" The
[Toronto] Globe & Mail (1 February 1997) D1.
12. Section 14 of the Act as amended, 1995, provides: "The cash contribution in respect of
the Canada Health and Social Transfer that may be provided to a province for a fiscal year is
an amount equal to the amount, if any, by which the total entitlement in respect of the Canada
Health and Social Transfer applicable to the province for that fiscal year exceeds the total
equalized tax transfer applicable to the province for that fiscal year." Supra note 3.
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annually unless it is indexed for inflation. Assuming it were not indexed,
it is estimated that the cash portion of the CHST could shrink to nil within
ten to fifteen years. To prevent this occurrence, the 1996 Budget Act
amended the Federal-Provincial FiscalArrangements Act to set a"floor"
of $11 billion per annum below which the cash portion of the CHST will
not be permitted to fall. 3 In 1997, this floor was raised to $12.5 billion.14
This suggests a legislative commitment to retaining leverage over pro-
vincial governments in the field of social policy.
Unlike CAP, which was financed on the basis of how much provincial
governments spent on social assistance, the CHST is financed on the basis
of the Gross National Product and provincial population. 5 This means
that the extent of need for social assistance at a particular juncture in time
is irrelevant under the CHST. In this fashion, the risk of welfare expen-
ditures rising in periods of economic downturn is off-loaded entirely to
the provinces. For example, if Ontario's welfare roll rose from 100,000
to 200,000, under CAP, both Ontario and the federal government's
funding for welfare in the province would have doubled. Under the
CHST, the federal government's portion would remain unchanged (as-
suming GNP and Ontario's population remained the same) while Ontario's
welfare expenditures would have to rise fourfold to meet the increased
demand.
Section 13 of the Act sets out the purposes underlying the CHST as
follows: 13(1)(a) establishing interim arrangements to finance social
programs in a manner that will increase provincial flexibility;
(b) maintaining the national criteria and conditions in the Canada Health
Act, including those respecting public administration, comprehensive-
ness, universality, portability and accessibility, and the provisions relat-
ing to extra-billing and user charges; (c) maintaining the national stan-
dard, set out in section 19, that no period of minimum residency be
required or allowed with respect to social assistance; and (d) romoting
any shared principles and objectives that are developed, pursuant to
subsection (3), with respect to the operation of social programs, other than
a program for the purpose referred to in paragraph (b). Section 13(3)
further provides for a consultative mechanism through which additional
intergovernmental cooperation under the CHST may take place:
13. See s. 15(3) of the Act, supra note 3, as amended by the Budget Implementation Act 1996,
S.C. 1996, c.18, s.49.
14. See Department of Finance Press Release at www.fin.gc.ca/newse97/97%2DI 16e.html.
15. This formula is set out in s.15(4) of the of the Act, as amended: supra note 13. Based on
this formula, the federal government is authorized to provide $26.9 billion in 1996/97, and
$25.1 billion in each of 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/2000.
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The Minister of Human Resources Development shall invite representa-
tives of all the provinces to consult and work together to develop, through
mutual consent, a set of shared principles and objects for the other social
programs referred to in paragraph (1)(d) that could underlie the Canada
Health and Social Transfer.
By establishing, as part of the CHST, a consultative process for the
development of additional shared principles and objectives for social
spending, the federal government has committed itself to a cooperative
federalist model with respect to additional national standards in the area
of social welfare. This initiative has not resulted in a fresh consensus
regarding the purposes of the CHST, nor however, has it been an empty
gesture.16 At a meeting of the federal and provincial first ministers in
1996, an agreement in principle was reached to develop a national benefit
in relation to child welfare.17
According to Peter Hogg, by the terms of s.13, the federal government
is henceforth "obliged" to consult the provinces before imposing addi-
tional conditions. 8 Thus, the possibility of the federal government
unilaterally adding further national standards would appear remote. The
provinces, for their part, have little interest in compromising their
flexibility with respect to social policy and thus are unlikely to consent to
additional conditions being imposed on the CHST. The only constituency
with a vested interest in establishing and enforcing additional conditions
is the group with the least means of furthering this goal -the welfare
recipients themselves.
16. Perhaps, most importantly, it has provided a framework within which to continue debate
on the future of Canada's social union. For an example of current thinking on the shape of such
a social union in the context of the CHST, see Tom Courchene's ACCESS proposals, discussed
below, and M. Biggs, Building Blocks for Canada's New Social Union: Working Paper
No. F/02 (Ottawa: Renouf, 1996).
17. See D. Ferguson, "Social Service Ministers Take Aim at Child Poverty-New Program
to Reward Low-Wage Families" Toronto Star (6 October 1997) A6; see also S. Bach &
S. Phillips, "Constructing a New Social Union: Child Care Beyond Infancy" in G. Swimmer,
ed., How Ottawa Spends 1997-98, Seeing Red: A Liberal Report Card (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press) 235.
18. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 145-49
[hereinafter Hogg]. In his 4th edition (1997) Hogg adds at 153 that s.13 of the Act represents
a "declaration that the federal government will in the future no longer set conditions on its
funding by unilateral fiat, which is how the conditions were established for the original shared-
cost programs." However, to the extent this "declaration" emerges from s.13, it is one that
would not appear to be legally enforceable.
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As for the conditions which exist, the CHST stipulates that the
provinces must meet certain national standards in order to be entitled to
the full cash portion of the CHST. Aside from those contained in the
Canada Health Act,19 only one condition is stipulated. Section 19 of the
Act provides as follows:
19.(1) In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution
referred to in section 14 of the fiscal year, the laws of the province must not.
(a) require or allow a period of residence in the province or
Canada to be set as a condition of eligibility for social assistance
or for the receipt or continued receipt thereof; or
(b) make or allow the amount, form or manner of social assistance
to be contingent upon a period of such residence.
The CHST provides a mechanism to impose fiscal penalties on those
provinces which do not comply with the criteria set out in the Act.20
Where non-compliance is established, mandatory fiscal penalties will
ensue. However, the process of establishing non-compliance vests Cabi-
net with considerable discretion.2 Even if a province was found not to be
in compliance with the CHST, it would remain open to the federal
government to conclude that the province's non-compliance was not
serious enough to warrant any financial penalty at all.
19. R.S., 1985 ,c. C-6. The CHST retains the five national conditions contained in the Canada
Health Act: comprehensiveness, universality, portability, accessibility and public administra-
tion. On the enforcement of these standards, see S. Choudhry,"The Enforcement of the Canada
Health Act" (1996) 41 McGill LJ. 461.
20. Section 17(2) provides that,
The cash contribution that may be provided to a province under this Part shall be reduced
or withheld for the purposes of giving effect to
(a) any order made by the Governor in Council in respect of the province under
section 15 or 16 of the Canada Health Act or section 21 or 22 of this Act; or
(b) any deduction from the cash contribution pursuant to section 20 of the
Canada Health Act.
Supra note 3.
21. Sections 21 and 22 provide as follows:
21 .(1) Where, on the referral of a matter under section 20, the Governor in Council
is of the opinion that the province does not or has ceased to comply with section 19,
the Governor in Council may, by order,
(a) direct that any cash contribution to that province for a fiscal year be reduced,
in respect of each non-compliance, by an amount that the Governor in Council
considers to be appropriate, having regard to the gravity of the non-compliance;
or
(b) where the Governor in Council considers it appropriate, direct that the whole
of any cash contribution to that province for a fiscal year be withheld. [Emphasis
added.]
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The view that the residency requirement will remain the only national
standard applicable to social assistance programs under the CHST is
strengthened by an analysis of the Parliamentary debates leading up to the
passage of the Budget Act (referred to then as Bill C-76). The debate
surrounding Bill C-76 took place during the acrimonious lead-up to the
1995 Quebec referendum campaign. As a result, Bloc Qu6b~cois mem-
bers sought to portray Bill C-76 as amounting to a reduction of funding
and an increase in federal control over social programs. On May 2, 1995,
for example, Lucien Bouchard, then Leader of the Opposition, declared,
"The fact of the matter is that no bill has ever given the federal
government so much power to impose national standards. 22
In response to these allegations, Liberal Minister of Finance Paul
Martin, on behalf of the government, stated unequivocally that only two
conditions would accompany the CHST: 1) that the Canada Health Act
objectives would remain, and 2) that no minimum residency requirement
be required for social assistance eligibility. At three different junctures in
his speech, Martin emphasized that they had "no intention of imposing
new national standards. 2 3 Subsequently, in reply to questions from a
Reform MP concerned that the consultative process might yield some
further imposition of other national standards, a Liberal MP reaffirmed
that the provinces "will be able to apply the social programs they deem
most appropriate in whatever manner they see fit, and will be the ones in
charge of this area. 24
The CHST signalled a dramatic departure from the federal government's
approach to social welfare under CAP. As the federal government made
clear, this was not merely an incidental effect of the new block grant
scheme but one of its central purposes.
3. The CHST as distinguished from CAP
Under the Canada Assistance Plan, the federal government and provin-
cial governments agreed to each pay 50% of the cost of providing social
assistance. The federal government's funding of social assistance was
22. In the case of a continuing failure to comply with section 19, any reduction or
withholding under section 21 of a cash contribution to a province for a fiscal year shall
be reimposed for each succeeding fiscal year as long as the Minister is satisfied, after
consultation with the minister responsible for social assistance in the province, that the
non-compliance is continuing. [Emphasis added]
Ibid.
22. House of Commons Debates (2 May 1995) at 12032.
23. Ibid. at 12034-6.
24. Ibid. at 12045.
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tied (1) to the number of recipients receiving social assistance, and (2) the
benefit levels set by provincial governments. CAP, like other shared cost
programs, represented the surmounting of the obstacles of federalism in
the interest of responding to the demands of those in need. Following the
striking down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Bennett's
New Deal ,25 which attempted to respond to the social needs generated by
the Depression through unilateral federal legislation, it became clear that
the Canadian welfare state could only develop through federal-provincial
cooperation. The factors motivating the meshing of federalism and the
welfare state were fiscal, political and constitutional in origin .26 Fiscally,
the federal government had a revenue base which grew steadily and
quickly in the post-war era by virtue of the expansion of the economy and
the income tax. Politically, the welfare state was a popular nation-
building initiative and federal politicians, from the Depression until the
1980s, ran on platforms to create, expand or preserve its programs.
Constitutionally, social programs fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the provincial governments by virtue of the division of powers in the
Constitution Act, 1867. Therefore, the federal government found itself in
the post-war era with the means and the desire to fund programs which
only the provincial governments had the jurisdiction to implement. This
impasse was cleared not only by constitutional amendment but also
through the federal government's expansive use of its constitutional
spending power which permitted the federal government to attach condi-
tions to its grants and thus to set national standards for areas outside its
legislative competence. 7 CAP was one of approximately 100 shared-
cost programs initiated by the federal government since the Second
World War.28
In response to the mounting federal deficit in the 1980s, the federal
government sought to scale back CAP expenditures. In 1990, for the first
time a spending cap on CAP was imposed by the federal government. The
restrictions on CAP applied only to the three "have" provinces - Ontario,
British Columbia and Alberta-limiting the growth of CAP funding to
5% annually. The result was that these three provinces began shouldering
more than 50% of social assistance spending. The funding disparity was
25. See Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 355.
26. See D. Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 2d ed. (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1985) [hereinafter The Emergence of Social Security].
27. The federal government's spending power is not expressly granted under s.91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, but rather is inferred from the power to levy taxes in s.91(3) and is
further supported by the federal powers in relation to public debt and property (s.91(IA)) and
to appropriate public funds (s.106).
28. See Hogg, supra note 18.
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exacerbated and accelerated due to the recession which struck those
provinces in the early 1990s. For example, in 1992/93 alone, Ontario was
estimated to have lost $1.7 billion due to reduced federal CAP funding .29
Between 1988 and 1993, Ontario's social assistance caseload doubled, as
did the proportion of Ontario's budget spent on social assistance. The
federal contribution per welfare recipient in Ontario fell from $3,100 in
1990/91 to $1,800 in 1994/95.30 The B.C. government sued the federal
government seeking to invalidate its unilateral funding cap. 3' The Su-
preme Court of Canada upheld these amendments on the basis that the
federal government's constitutional spending power provided it the
unfettered jurisdiction to spend its money as it saw fit.32
CAP placed important limitations on the flexibility of the provinces to
design and implement social policy utilizing federal funds. Under CAP,
the Minister was given the authority to enter into an agreement with any
province to provide for the payment of contributions towards provin-
cially administered social programs. These federal transfers under CAP
were tied to a number of conditions referred to as "terms of agreement".
These conditions required that:
(i) the provinces must provide social assistance to all those in need
regardless of the cause of a person's need;
(ii) the provinces must take into account a recipient's budgetary needs;
(iii) the provinces could not impose a minimum residency period as a
condition of receiving social assistance;
(iv) provinces must provide for recipients to have a route of appeal;
(v) provinces could not require recipients to work as a condition of
receiving social assistance; and
(vi) provinces must keep records regarding programs and services under
CAP.
33
29. See Social Canada, supra note 3 at 118.
30. Ibid.
31. See Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 [hereinafter CAP Reference].
32. In his analysis of this case, Peter Hogg remarked (supra note 18 at 152): "It seems to me
that the better view of the law is that the federal Parliament may spend or lend its funds to any
government or institution or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses; and that it may
attach to any grant or loan any conditions it chooses, including conditions it could not directly
legislate." For a discussion of the breadth of the federal spending power, see A. Petter,
"Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. at 448; and
E. Driedger, "The Spending Power" (1981) 7 Queen's LJ. 124. See also Winterhaven Stables
v. Canada (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 413 (Alta. C.A.) (Leave to appeal to SCC denied (1989)
55D.L.R. (4th) viii); and YMHA Jewish Community Centre v. Brown, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1532.
33. For a discussion of these standards, see Torjman & Battle, supra note 5.
154 The Dalhousie Law Journal
While these conditions did not mandate any uniform or national levels
of social assistance, they did create obligations on provincial govern-
ments which were held to be enforceable by social assistance recipients
as well as the federal government.34 CAP was simply a contract between
governments. However, the effect of CAP was to create a national
entitlement to social assistance funded in relation to need. 5
The nature and scope of this entitlement was considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Finlay v. Canada (1993).36 In Finlay, a
welfare recipient had received overpayments from the Manitoba govern-
ment. The government sought to recover these overpayments by deduc-
tions of 5% from Finlay's monthly allowance. He challenged those
deductions as a violation of CAP, specifically on the basis of section
6(2)(a) which established as a condition of the Manitoba government
receiving federal contributions that the province agree to provide assis-
tance to any person in the province who is in need in an amount that takes
into account the basic requirements of that person.
A slim majority of the Court (5-4) upheld the deductions. The majority
held that s.6 established the principles and objectives of CAP, but that this
did not dictate precise terms with which the provincial legislation had to
comply. Writing for the majority, Sopinka J. held:
In my view, s.6(2)(a) requires assistance to be provided in an amount that
is compatible, or consistent, with an individual's basic requirements. It
thus requires something more than mere "consideration" of an individual's
basic requirements. If that were all that were required, a province could
provide almost any amount of assistance, including an amount far less than
that which would be compatible with basic requirements, as long as it had
turned its mind to such requirements. Such an interpretation would not
even permit the federal government to limit its contributions to schemes
that were of the general nature it wished to support. I cannot accept this as
34. See Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 321
[hereinafter Finlay (1986) cited to D.L.R.]. It is important to emphasize that Finlay was not
granted standing to directly challenge the federal government's funding of a provincial welfare
scheme under CAP. Rather, Finlay was granted public interest standing. To meet this threshold,
Finlay established that there was a serious issue to adjudicated, that he had a genuine interest
in the outcome, and that the matter would not otherwise be litigated.
35. Rice, in distinguishing CAP from the CHST, emphasized, "No matter how many people
were forced onto welfare or for what reasons, CAP ensured the development and existence of
a nationwide social welfare system. People who could not meet their own needs were protected
from falling into destitution. With the introduction of the CHST ... changes to the previous
fundamental conditions undermine the notion of universal rights contained within the CAP
system." See Rice, supra note 5 at 198.
36. [199311 S.C.R. 1080, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 567 [hereinafter Finlay (1993) cited to D.L.R.].
For a critique of this decision, see M. Young, "Starving in the Shadow of the Law: A Comment
on Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance)" (1994) 5 Constitutional Forum 31.
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Parliament's intention. However, s.6(2)(a) does not necessitate an exact fit
in the sense of requiring a province to provide an amount of assistance that
"fulfills" or "equals" basic requirements for each payment period.37
Writing for the dissenting minority, McLachlin J. held that CAP
required that, in order to be eligible for full federal funding, the provinces
had to implement a scheme for social assistance which provided for the
basic requirements of the person in need (i.e., "food, shelter, clothing,
fuel, utilities, household supplies, and personal requirements").38
McLachlin J. added that if the Manitoba scheme had never adequately
provided for Finlay's basic requirements to begin with, any deduction
would necessarily deprive him of his basic requirements.39 On this basis,
the minority of the Court would have struck down the Manitoba overpay-
ment recovery scheme. Notwithstanding the narrower approach adopted
by the majority, Finlay confirmed that CAP provided welfare recipients
with an enforceable entitlement to some level of benefits but not to any
particular minimum level.
The national standards contained in CAP are not present in the
legislation establishing the CHST (with the exception of the residency
requirement). Obviously, recipients do not have any standing to enforce
national standards which no longer exist. The CHST represents a new
model of "flexibility" in the social policy sphere, one calculated to defeat
any claim to an entitlement to welfare by rendering all federal funding for
social programs a matter of legislative or executive discretion. The CHST
has thus removed two related and fundamental aspects of the Canadian
welfare state: 1) the obligation on governments to respond to the "basic
requirements" of those in need, along with other national standards; and
2) a cause of action for welfare recipients themselves to enforce those
standards.
4. The CHST and its Critics
While all observers agree the CHST removes national standards from
social welfare programs, there is less agreement as to whether this is a step
forwards or backwards for the welfare state.
Critics fear the CHST, by pitting popular, universal "middle class"
benefits such as health care and postsecondary education against unpopu-
lar, means-tested social assistance benefits ensures that social assistance
will receive a smaller slice of a shrinking social programs pie. n° The
37. Ibid. at 574-75.
38. Ibid. at 592.
39. Ibid. at 600.
40. See "Women and the CHST," supra note 5 at 381.
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removal of national standards from social welfare, while retaining them
for health care, reinforces this view of the CHST. Combined with
provincial initiatives to reduce welfare expenditures, institute workfare
and limit eligibility for benefits, critics charge that the Canadian welfare
state is regressing to a time when welfare was a minimally funded, locally
administered system of "last resort" assistance, intended as much to
correct perceived flaws in the character and work ethic of recipients as to
alleviate poverty. In the words of Loren Fried, executive director of the
North York Harvest Food Bank, the CHST "unleashed the most destruc-
tive chain reaction of government domino downloading and government
cost-cutting of welfare and social spending that has ever been inflicted on
Canada's poor and marginalized population."'" These observers further
caution that "flexibility" is a euphemism for imposing additional
behavioural conditions on welfare recipients such as "workfare,"
"learnfare," "bridefare" and the "family cap," and that the CHST will
reinforce the pernicious distinction between the "deserving" and the
"undeserving" poor, which reserves special stigma for groups such as
single mothers, and able-bodied, employable individuals who are outside
the labour force .42
Supporters, by contrast, predict the devolution of powers over social
policy will result in each province experimenting with new ideas on
welfare, leading to innovation and competitive federalism. These observ-
ers highlight the virtues of competitive federalism and the policy initia-
tives that might be nurtured by allowing different provinces to take
different paths in the amelioration of poverty. They cite the example of
Canada's health care system, modelled after a social experiment which
succeeded in Saskatchewan in the 1950s. As well, labour codes, human
rights codes and public auto insurance all were introduced through
provincial pilot projects. For Tom Courchene, provincial leadership is
necessary in the social policy sphere as the evolution of federalism veers
away from a "negative integration" model, under which the federal
government issues "thou shall nots" to the provinces, and towards a
41. G. Fraser, "Ottawa Urged to Take Lead on Poverty Issues" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail
(6 December 1997) A16.
42. See I. Morrison & G. Pearce, "Under the Axe: Social Assistance in Ontario in 1995"
(1995) 11 J. Law & Soc. Pol'y 1; M. Evans, "Linking Welfare to Jobs: Workfare Canadian
Style" (1994) 16:4 Policy Options 25; M. Drumbl, "Exploring the Constitutional Limits to
Workfare & Learnfare" (1994) 10 J. Law & Soc. Pol'y 107; "Women and the CHST," supra
note 5 at 379-80; and Battle & Torjman, supra note 5 at 3. On the deserving/undeserving
dichotomy generally, see J. Handler & Y. Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty:
Welfare Reform in America (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991); and M. Katz, The
Undeserving Poor: The War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books,
1989).
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"positive integration" approach, exemplified by intergovernmental ac-
cords such as the Agreement on Internal Trade.43 Additionally, Courchene
points out that welfare standards were already arbitrary and unequal
under CAP."
The debate between the critics and the supporters of devolution may
be critical to the future of fiscal federalism. However, in my view, the
focus on the contest over fiscal federalism obscures much of the meaning
and the danger of the CHST for the Canadian welfare state. At least with
respect to social welfare, the real issue underlying the CHST is not what
level of government is vested with discretion over regulating social
welfare, but rather how, and in whose interests, governments exercise
their discretion. As I stated at the outset of this paper, welfare is
principally about the substance of state assistance, not about who pays for
the programs or signs the social assistance cheques. If anything, the
division of powers in the field of social welfare renders both levels of
government less accountable for their respective policies.45
The limits which may constrain the federal government's exercise of
its spending power are found in the requirements of administrative and
constitutional law which in part control state action in Canada. The task
of determining and delineating such limits may fall to the courts through
judicial review. However, as I discuss below, this is a task that courts in
Canada appear to have abdicated by expanding their reliance on admin-
istrative and constitutional doctrines of legislative deference.
II. Judicial Review and the CHST
In this section, I explore whether judicial review of the CHST may guide
the exercise of the federal government's spending power in relation to
social welfare.
Courts historically have served as a catalyst for shaping social welfare
policy in Canada. Indeed, as noted above, it was the refusal of the Judicial
43. ACCESS, supra note 2 at 5.
44. Courchene points out that for a couple with two children in 1993, benefit levels ranged
from $9,512 in New Brunswick to $19,695 in Ontario, annually. See T. Courchene, Redistrib-
uting Money and Power: A Guide to the Canada Health and Social Transfer (Vancouver: C.D.
Howe Institute, 1995) at 52.
45. See Petter, supra note 32 at 467, where he argues, "the spending power does not simply
shift political responsibility from one order of government to the other; it intersperses
responsibility between both orders. The result is to require those advocating a particular reform
to fight a battle on two fronts. At the same time, it becomes virtually impossible for citizens
to determine which order of government to hold accountable for policies that fail or, for that
matter, for ones that succeed. The consequence is to diminish the influence of the ordinary
citizens over government policy-making and to heighten the power of governmental elites."
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Committee of the Privy Council to sanction the federal government's
attempt to unilaterally provide unemployment insurance that paved the
way for federal-provincial cooperation in the construction of the Cana-
dian welfare state. While the courts have provided a frequently used
forum for resolving disputes between governments over federalism, they
have not been equally hospitable to the recipients of public assistance.
Welfare recipients are a poorly organized constituency. Their capacity
to influence the decision-making of either federal or provincial govern-
ments is extremely limited.16 It is only in light of these obstacles to
political solutions that the courtroom appears to hold such promise-
despite the fact that litigation brought by welfare recipients and claimants
has yielded few successes. Partially, out of desperation, but also as an
appeal to principle, welfare recipients continue to seek to advance their
interests in the courts. Litigation remains an appealing option for those
who seek to resist and roll back government cuts in the social policy
sphere for two reasons: (1) recourse to the protections of administrative
and constitutional law casts welfare recipients as citizens with rights to
assert and entitlements to enforce, which has been generally associated
with the empowerment of litigants;47 and (2) courts are the only political
institution with the practical capacity and remedial authority to allow
welfare recipients to challenge the government's design and implemen-
tation of social benefits.48 The government can and does, after all, ignore
protests but cannot as readily resist litigation. For this reason, litigation
46. Jackman emphasizes that the vulnerability of welfare recipients renders them especially
marginalized by the democratic process. See M. Jackman, "Constitutional Rhetoric and Social
Justice: Reflections on the Justiciability Debate" in Social Justice and the Constitution, supra
note 9, 17 at 23-25.
47. For this reason, the Supreme Court's ruling in Finlay (1986), supra note 34, was hailed
as a substantial victory for welfare recipients as the Court recognized that federal spending in
the social welfare sphere gave rise to governmental obligations enforceable by welfare
recipients. Le Dain J. held (at 341): "as a person in need within the contemplation of [CAP] who
complains of having been prejudiced by the alleged provincial non-compliance shows that he
is a person with a genuine interest in these issues and not a mere busybody." Under the CHST,
however, "a person in need" has no relevance to the provision of federal funding. However,
because the CHST contains a mechanism for enforcing certain conditions (consisting for now
of only the residency requirement) welfare recipients would appear to retain a "genuine
interest" in the validity of the CHST. On the implications of Finlay (1986) for the law of
standing, see K. Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
1994) at 5.120; W.A. Bogart, "Understanding Standing, Chapter IV: Minister of Finance of
Canada v. Finlay" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L. R. 377; T. Cromwell,"From Trilogy to Quartet:
Minister of Finance v. Finlay" (1987), 7 Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 103.
48. The most probable relief sought in a challenge to the CHST would be declaratory in
nature. This would enable a Court to set out the obligations of the federal government while
leaving to the government to determine precisely how to fulfil those obligations.
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may be the "last resort" of groups that are marginalized in the legislative
process. 9 Because governments must listen to the pronouncements of
the courts, vulnerable groups such as welfare recipients continue to seek
a voice there.50
The importance of establishing limits on the "flexibility" of govern-
ments in the field of social welfare must be seen in historical as well as
legal contexts. Allowing local governments "flexibility" often has been
used to implement welfare policies unequally and arbitrarily - to control
welfare recipients by making their eligibility dependent on the "good
graces" of state officials.5' Further, flexibility in the social policy context
has often permitted discretionary powers to be used to do nothing.
Because of this history, welfare rights have been viewed as a necessary
and effective means by which welfare recipients and their advocates may
supervise government (in)action.12 However, courts supervise govern-
ments in a specialized and limited way, privileging the abstract rights of
citizens over their concrete needs .53
To date, the CHST has not been judicially considered in Canada. 4
What follows is an account of the administrative and constitutional
49. For further discussion of this point, see K. Roach, "The Role of Litigation and the Charter
in Interest Advocacy" in F.L. Seidle, ed., Equity & Community: The Charter, Interest
Advocacy and Representation (Kingston: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1993) 159.
50. For example, when the Ontario Tories announced a 21% cut to welfare benefits in the fall
of 1995, a group of recipients retained a group of lawyers headed by Mary Eberts to launch a
Constitutional challenge. See Masse v. Ontario (Com. & Soc. Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R.
(4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. refused (30 April 1996) Doc. CA M 17794 (Ont.
C.A.) [hereinafter Masse]. See also Falkiner v. Ontario, [19961 OJ. No. 3737 (QL) (Div. Ct.)
(in which welfare recipients challenged the "man in the house" rule under Ontario's welfare
legislation).
51. See F. Piven & R. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New
York: Vintage, 1993) at 248-340. For this reason, members of disadvantaged minorities likely
to be the target of discrimination by state officials often view structured rights as preferable to
broad discretion. See, e.g., R. Delgado, "The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies
Have What Minorities Want?" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301 at 314-15; M. Matsuda,
"Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 323 at 390-91; and P. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401 at 408.
52. See, e.g., J. Mashaw, "Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children in Virginia" (1971) 57 Va. L. Rev. 818.
53. See for a fuller discussion of these issues, J. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of
Judicial Review (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1996).
54. According to Janet Mosher, a workshop was held at the University of Toronto Law School
in 1996 in which launching ajudicial review of the CHST was recommended. Apparently this
has not yet taken place. A Quicklaw search conducted in June of 1998 revealed that no
Canadian court has yet to rule on either the meaning or the validity of the provisions of the
CHST, although the obligation of the federal government to provide the CHST so long as the
provinces fulfil the conditions set out therein was confirmed in Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
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doctrines that would likely be at issue if such a challenge were mounted
in search of restoring national standards to social welfare. It should be
reiterated that the CHST, like CAP before it, cannot compel provincial
governments to design particular welfare programs or fund them at
particular levels. Because the federal spending power is limited to placing
conditions on federal funding, it will always remain open to provincial
governments simply to refuse federal funding and develop whatever
social programs they wish. In this sense, major aspects of the Canadian
welfare state will always rest on provincial autonomy. However, what the
spending power does make possible is the establishment of norms to
guide the design and development of social programs. Conditional grants
such as the CHST ought to embody the common ground and shared
aspirations of all Canadians with respect to the areas of government
activity being funded. When they fail to do this, such grants deprive
Canadians of a tangible and meaningful entitlement.
1. Administrative Law and the CHST
Administrative law delineates the legal boundaries of public authority.
While administrative law is concerned with jurisdiction rather than the
content of government action, these two issues often become entangled.
For example, where a statute gives a Minister the discretion to close a
hospital for regulatory infractions and the minister decides instead to
close the hospital for budgetary reasons, the court will quash the decision
on the basis that the Minister exceeded the authority of the statute . This
amounts to a procedural protection which may have important substan-
tive implications. In the case of the CHST, the scope of administrative
law supervision similarly will turn on an analysis of the purpose(s) of the
transfer.
As set out above, section 13 states that one of the purposes of the CHST
is to establish "interim arrangements to finance social programs in a
manner that will increase provincial flexibility" .56 "Social programs" are
defined to include "programs in respect of health, post-secondary educa-
tion, social assistance and social services. 57 Therefore, the definition of
"social program" under the CHST is illustrative rather than exhaustive -
it includes "social assistance" and "social services" but is not limited to
these. "Social assistance" is further defined broadly as "aid in any form
to or in respect of a person in need."58
55. See Re: Doctors Hospital and Minister of Health (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 164 (Div. Ct.).
56. Section 13(i)(a) of the Act, as amended, supra note 3 [emphasis added].
57. Section 25 of the Act, as amended, ibid.
58. Section 18 of the Act, as amended, ibid.
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As the provinces have complete discretion with respect to which social
programs will receive CHST funds, even if a province announced that it
was no longer going to provide "social assistance" benefits of any kind,
this would appear to be within the contemplation of the CHST. Indeed,
as a practical matter, the federal government currently does not require
provinces to report how the CHST funds are spent, nor does it have any
supervisory mechanism to ensure the grant is allotted to programs which
meet the definition of "social programs" contained in the Act.59 Parlia-
ment has stated the purposes of the CHST, but as those purposes only
indirectly connect the funding of social assistance to the provision of aid
to those in need, this significantly reduces the scope of judicial review
under administrative law.
The nature of the CHST could (and perhaps should) result in merely
shifting the focus of legal regulation from the federal to the provincial
sphere. However, an examination of recent challenges to provincial
social welfare schemes on the basis of administrative law reveals that
courts are prepared to afford virtually unlimited discretion regarding the
types of welfare programs, and the levels of welfare support, to provincial
governments. In Masse v. Ontario,60 for example, the Ontario
government's decision to cut social assistance benefits by 21.6% was
challenged as being ultra vires Ontario's General Welfare Assistance
Act 6' and Family Benefits Act.62 Each of the three Divisional Court
judges hearing the case issued a separate judgment. All three agreed,
however, that the reduction in social assistance benefits was within the
jurisdiction of the provincial government and consistent with the pur-
poses of the impugned welfare legislation. O'Brien J., who addressed this
issue specifically, added:
In reaching my conclusions on the administrative law arguments I agree
with comments made by Professor Hogg in ConstitutionalLaw ofCanada,
3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at pp. 922-12, where he states:
It seems that virtually any benefit program could be held to be under-
inclusive in some respects.
59. I am grateful to the staff of the Ontario Ministry for Intergovernmental Affairs for
clarifying how the CHST is treated from the standpoint of provincial budgeting. Recently,
Prime Minister Chr6tien rejected calls to infuse more money into the CHST on the basis that
there was no guarantee the additional funds would be spent on social programs (or health care
specifically). Chrdtien stated, "In the transfer payments, when we send the cheque, after that
we don't know what happens to the money on the CHST... some provinces say, it's not your
business, we might put this into roads." See McCarthy, supra note 1.
60. Supra note 50.
61. R.S.O. 1990, c.G.6.
62. R.S.O. 1990, c.F.2.
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The question of the finality of policy decisions was concisely expressed in
Thorne's Hardware Ltd. v. The Queen [cite omitted]. Mr. Justice Dickson
(as he then was) considered the matter... :
Decisions made by the Governor in Council in matters of public
convenience and general policy are final and not reviewable in legal
proceedings. Although the possibility of striking down an Order in
Council on jurisdictional or other compelling grounds remains
open, it would take an egregious case to warrant such action.
00.
The courts should not lightly interfere with government decisions made on
a legislative or policy level and I agree with statements that the available
remedy should be political, not legal.63
One of the rare instances of a court striking down government legislation
in the social policy sphere occurred in Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of
B.C. v. British Columbia (Minister of Social Services),64 in which a
British Columbia court held that a residency provision instituted by the
provincial government, requiring individuals to be resident in B.C. 90
days before becoming eligible for social assistance, was ultra vires the
Guaranteed Available Income for Need Act, 5 and therefore invalid.
Additionally, because the measure was contrary to the CAP standard
regarding residency, the federal government had withheld $46 million in
transfer payments from the province. The regulation in question empow-
ered the Minister to exercise discretion in a number of contexts, including
that of designating benefits and establishing the criteria of eligibility. The
applicants argued that the regulation was beyond the powers of the
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council, that it was inconsistent with the pur-
pose of GAIN, that it was discriminatory and not authorized under GAIN
and that it violated the B.C. Human Rights Act. Spencer J. characterized
the purpose of GAIN as "the relief of poverty, neglect or suffering...
within the budgetary allowance to be provided by the legislature from
time to time and the establishment of the Minister's discretionary powers
to achieve it."' 6 6 Distinguishing between residents and non-residents was
held not to be consistent with this purpose. 67
63. See Masse, supra note 50 at 55-56.
64. [1996] B.CJ. No. 2088 (QL) (S.C.).
65. R.S.B.C. 1979, c.158 [hereinafter GAIN].
66. Supra note 64 at para. 17.
67. Spencer J. stated (ibid. at para. 20), "At first glance s.26(2)(d) seems to give an unlimited
power to pass a regulation which establishes rules of eligibility for income assistance. But read
in the context of the whole Act can that be so? Could the government by regulation declare that
only people of certain occupations, persuasions, places of residence within the Province or age
groups or that one sex only be eligible for assistance? The answer to that rhetorical question
is clearly that it could not. Nothing in the context of the Act enables eligibility to be accorded
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While government action taken under the authority of the CHST
would be difficult to invalidate as being inconsistent with its purpose, it
may be possible to impugn the establishment of the CHST on the basis
that it eliminated two important entitlements from federal social welfare
funding without allowing those affected a chance to be heard. The two
entitlements are: 1) the obligation on governments to respond to the
"basic requirements" of those in need, along with other national stan-
dards; and 2) a cause of action for recipients to enforce those standards.
There are two related administrative law doctrines on which a challenge
to the establishment of the CHST could be launched: 1) the rules of
natural justice; and 2) the doctrine of legitimate expectations.
a. The Rules of Natural Justice
The rules of naturaljustice impose a duty of fairness on the state in making
and implementing administrative decisions. The rules of natural justice
have been used to attain some procedural guarantees for recipients of
public assistance in Canada.68 However, on balance, the rules of natural
justice have proven an ineffective instrument with which to advance the
interests of the poor.69 First, this is because a court will only intervene in
the government's policy decisions if the case has a "sufficient legal
component." Decisions held to be "purely political" have been held to be
non-justiciable."0 Second, decisions characterized as "legislative" have
been held to be outside the scope of the rules of natural justice.7 '
In the CAP Reference, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government's unilateral amendment of CAP notwithstanding its agree-
ment with the provinces in relation to cost-sharing was justiciable
because the legal interpretation of a statute and the agreement between the
provinces and the federal government was at issue. Therefore, the dispute
in any of those ways. They are far removed from its purposes, namely the relief of poverty,
neglect and suffering within the financial parameters set by the legislature in its budget from
time to time."
68. On these grounds, welfare benefits cannot be denied applicants, or taken from recipients,
without some provision for the applicant/recipient being heard. See, for example, Re Webb
and Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 at 195 (Ont. C.A.) (holding that
if a recipient of public housing assistance is deprived of part or all of those benefits, that
recipient must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard before those benefits are
taken away).
69. See generally E. Tucker, "The Political Economy of Administrative Fairness" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall L.J. 555.
70. See CAP Reference, supra note 31 at 545. See also Canada (Auditor-General) v. Canada
(Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources), [19891 2 S.C.R. 49 at 90-91.
71. "Legislative" functions for these purposes has been defined as "[a] purely ministerial
decision, on broad grounds of public policy." See Martineau v. Matsqui Institution, [1980]
1 S.C.R. 602 at 628.
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between the provinces and the federal government was held not to be
"purely political" in nature. However, having found the dispute justi-
ciable, the Court held that procedural fairness, a component of the rules
of natural justice, does not reach the "legislative functions" of govern-
ment-this included ministerial decisions "on broad grounds of public
policy" -and consequently the cap on CAP was upheld." There is little
doubt that the CHST would be upheld on the same bases. While welfare
recipients may claim that they should have a voice in substantial changes
to the federal funding of social welfare programs, the Supreme Court has
elsewhere held that the government is not obliged to consult any particu-
lar constituency in carrying out its legislative functions.73
b. Legitimate Expectations
Some observers have argued that the exclusion of legislative functions
(such as the removal of national standards for social welfare in the CHST)
from procedural fairness requirements by Canadian courts is unduly
restrictive. 74 As a possible alternative, they point to the doctrine of
"legitimate expectations," which is sometimes seen as an extension of the
duty of fairness and sometimes as an independent duty on governments
to abide by their undertakings. The doctrine of legitimate expectations
states that where the government promises to follow a particular proce-
dure in reaching a decision, and then deviates from that procedure without
the consent of the affected parties, those parties may invalidate that
decision based on the breach of their legitimate expectations.7 1 In the
U.K., this doctrine has been be extended to hold governments account-
able for substantive promises regarding the scope and nature of govern-
72. See CAP Reference, supra note 31 at 558, citing Martineau, ibid. For the "legislative
functions" exception to the application of fairness, see Canada (A.G.) v. Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; Cardinal and Oswald v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S .C.R. 643;
and Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653.
73. See Native Women's Ass. of Canada etal v. The Queen. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627,119 D.L.R.
(4th) 224.
74. See D. Wright, "Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations in Canadian
Administrative Law" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ. 139; see also DJ. Mullan, "Canada
Assistance Plan - Denying Legitimate Expectations A Fair Start" (1993) 7 Admin. L.R. (2d)
269.
75. This doctrine was first confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Old St. Boniface
Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170.
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ment benefits.76 However, courts appear not to have adopted this broader
approach to the doctrine in Canada.77
The restrictive approach of the Supreme Court of Canada was once
again demonstrated in the CAP Reference. The Court of Appeal had held
that the federal government's cap on CAP violated the legitimate expec-
tations of the provinces that they would be consulted prior to any change
in the structure of CAP. 78 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this
finding. Sopinka J. held the doctrine of legitimate expectations, while a
part of administrative law in Canada, did not extend to the "legislative
functions" of government:
Parliamentary government would be paralyzed if the doctrine of legitimate
expectations could be applied to prevent the government from introducing
legislation in Parliament. Such expectations might be created by state-
ments during an election campaign. The business of government would be
stalled while the application of the doctrine and its effect was argued out
in the courts. Furthermore, it is fundamental to our system of government
that a government is not bound by the undertakings of its predecessor. The
doctrine of legitimate expectations would place a fetter on this essential
feature of democracy."
This reasoning with respect to legislative decision-making was ap-
plied by the Ontario Divisional Court to the context of executive funding
decisions in Hamilton-Wentworth (Reg. Mun.) v. Ontario (Min. of
Tran.).8° In that case, a regional municipality challenged a provincial
government's decision to stop funding a highway. Funding the project
was subject to annual review by the provincial government. In 1990, after
construction of the highway was under way, a new provincial govern-
ment ordered that funding for part of the project be stopped due to
environmental concerns.
The Ontario Divisional Court dismissed the regional municipality's
application forjudicial review to reverse the province's cancellation of its
promised funding. The Court held that the provincial government had
reserved to itself a discretion (i.e., annual review of the budget for the
project), and was therefore free to exercise that discretion (i.e., curtail
funding) as it saw fit. While a Minister may not use a statute designed for
76. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparte Khan, [1985] 1 All E.R.
40 (C.A.). There is also some authority for a narrower approach to legitimate expectations in
the U.K.: see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Ministerfor the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374
(H.L.) at 408 per Diplock L.J Both these cases are discussed in Wright, supra note 74 at
152-53.
77. Ibid. at 156-65.
78. Re: Canada Assistance Plan (1990), 45 Admin. L.R. 34 (B.C. C.A.).
79. CAP Reference, supra note 31 at 559.
80. (1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Hamilton-Wentworth].
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one purpose to achieve another (as discussed above), the wisdom of the
executive's discretionary determination is not reviewable by the Court.8
Specifically, the Court held that it would be inappropriate for judges to
trench upon the Cabinet's discretion to determine how it spends its
revenue:
Because the Act requires annual review and allocation, it does not
confer any right on the Region to receive any particular amount of funding
in any particular year. It is equally clear that there is no jurisdiction in this
court to direct the Minister to make any particular allocation to the Region.
The "doctrine of legitimate expectations" does not impose any positive
obligation on the government to grant the substantive right claimed in
these proceedings. While the various commitments have no doubt led
many acting in good faith into a dilemma which has caused them great
expense, it does not follow that the court can dictate to the government its
view of public interest in such matters.82
Immunizing legislative and executive bodies from the application of
the doctrine of legitimate expectations has been criticized as failing to
recognize any mechanisms whereby governments may be held account-
able for how they deal with their most vulnerable citizens. David Wright,
for example, advances this argument in the following terms:
Determinations such as the amount of welfare payments or tuition fees are
often delegated to the executive to be set by regulation. While large benefit
cuts or fee increases may be considered to be in the broad "public interest"
certain people bear the brunt of these decisions, and it is crucial to require
to require some consultation with them when the decisions are being made.
At the very least, this is because people have planned their lives based on
the existing state of affairs.8 3
While such criticisms hold out the hope for the future evolution of this
area of administrative law, for the moment, it would appear that neither
the doctrine of legitimate expectations, nor the rules of natural justice are
capable of redressing the government's removal of national standards for
welfare in the CHST. Indeed, these doctrines, even if held to be applicable
to legislative and executive settings, are not intended to lead to substan-
tive changes to legislation or how legislation is applied, but rather to
procedural rights requiring additional consultation with affected parties.
Given the limited influence of welfare recipients on political decision-
making mentioned above, this would constitute a hollow victory at best.
81. See also Doctors Hospital, supra note 55 and Re: Metropolitan General Hospital and
Minister of Health (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 530 at 536 (Ont. H.C.J.). See also Operation
Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
82. Hamilton- Wentworth, supra note 80 at 306. This view is consistent with the dicta of
Sopinka J. in CAP Reference, supra note 31.
83. Wright, supra note 74 at 192.
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Moreover, if such consultations were ordered, the terms of the CHST
would seem to make the provinces, not welfare recipients, the affected
parties (as was the case under the CAP Reference, discussed above).
2. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the CHST
The Constitution is the supreme law in Canada and early decisions
confirmed that, unlike administrative law, the exercise of executive and
legislative decision-making is subject to review under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.84 As in the administrative law context, the question
to answer is whether by removing the obligation on government to
respond to the "basic requirements" of those in need, along with other
national standards, and thereby depriving recipients of a cause of action
against governments to enforce those standards, the federal government
has violated the Charter.
As noted above, by virtue of the division of powers under the
Constitution Act of 1867, the federal government has no jurisdiction to
dictate to the provinces what social programs the provinces should
legislate. Therefore, a Charter challenge of the CHST would not be
intended to force the provinces to enact certain kinds of social assistance
programs, but rather to clarify the conditions for provincial eligibility to
the CHST, beyond that which is set out in the Act (i.e., the residency
requirement). The Charter in this fashion could be used to compel the
federal government to impose "implied" conditions to the CHST, or
extend the conditions to be applied to remedy under-inclusiveness.
Judicial review of the CHST on Charter grounds would likely revolve
around sections 7 and 15. The application of each of these sections to the
CHST are discussed below. The general nature and impact of Charter
jurisprudence on the poor has been exhaustively detailed elsewhere.85 I
will limit the following analysis to a brief review of the leading cases on
welfare rights and their specific implications for the CHST.
84. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. lI [hereinafter Charter]. See Operation Dismantle, supra note 81.
85. See M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter for Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19
Queen's LJ. 65 [hereinafter "Poor Rights"]; R. Howse, "Another Rights Revolution? The
Charter and the Reform of Social Regulation in Canada" in J. Maxwell, P. Grady & R. Howse,
eds., Redefining Social Security (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University,
1995) 99; and T. Scassa, "Social Welfare and Section 7 of the Charter: Conrad v. Halifax
(County of)" (1994) 17 Dal. LJ. 187 at 192. See generally I. Morrison, "Security of the Person
and the Person in Need: Section 7 of the Charter and the Right to Welfare" (1988), 4 J. Law
& Soc. Pol'y 1; R.A. Hasson, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter and Income
Maintenance Legislation" (1989), 5 J. Law & Soc. Pol'y I and I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the
Charter and Constitutionally Protected Welfare" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1.
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a. Welfare Rights Under Section 7
The search for a constitutional right to welfare in Canada has focused on
section 7 of the Charter. Section 7 provides as follows:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
There are two stages for determining if section 7 has been violated. First,
the court must determine whether there has been a deprivation of life,
liberty or security of the person. Second, the court must consider whether
this deprivation was in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice .86
The question at issue under section 7 thus would be whether there is
any irreducible minimum below which state assistance could not fall
without violating recipients' constitutional right to life, liberty and
security of the person. A variety of attempts to advance a substantive right
to welfare on the basis of the "security of the person" component of
section 7 have failed to meet with any significant success.87
As no right to welfare has yet to be found in section 7 of the Charter
(although it remains for the Supreme Court to consider this issue
directly), recourse to whether an individual has been deprived of such a
right in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice usually has
not been necessary. However, the jurisprudence elaborating upon the
principles of fundamental justice under section 7 may shed light on
normative requirements applicable to the social welfare setting.
The principles of fundamental justice arise out of, but extend beyond
the rules of natural justice in administrative law .88 In this sense, section
7 may be used to advance the argument that welfare recipients ought to
86. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 584 [hereinafter
Rodriguez].
87. Commenting on the first decade of Charter jurisprudence, however, Jackman noted that
"[w]hile in principle, the design and implementation of social welfare legislation should be
open to Charter scrutiny, in practice, few welfare related claims have been decided by courts,
and even fewer have been successful." See "Poor Rights," supra, note 85 at 67.
88. As Lamer J. (as he then was) observed, "[t]he principles of fundamental justice are to be
found in the basic tenets ... of our legal system." Re: B.C. Motor Vehicles Act, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R.
486 at 512 [hereinafter Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Actl. For a discussion of the distinction between
the rules of natural justice and the principles of fundamental justice, see J. Evans, "The
Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution and the Common Law" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. 51. See also M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the
Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257 at 322, where Jackman remarks that, "[ilt is difficult
to accept that the state might be allowed to deny constitutionally protected welfare rights
completely and irrespective of individual need, so long as it does so with procedural regularity
and in a manner which does not offend other Charter guarantees."
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play a meaningful role in the policy process relating to social welfare.89
Section 7, however, also extends beyond procedural safeguards. The
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the concept of "substantive
fundamental justice" as a component of the principles of fundamental
justice.90 By substantive fundamental justice, the Court has in mind
certain minimum substantive requirements, the absence of which would
be inherently incompatible with section 7 of the Charter. For example,
offences of absolute liability, under which a person could be deprived of
liberty irrespective of the person's mental state at the time the offence was
committed, were held to constitute a violation of substantive fundamental
justice.9'
An analogous argument was raised in Rodriguez, in which a woman
seeking to invalidate the criminal provision prohibiting assisted suicide
contended that respect for human dignity constituted a substantive
requirement of fundamental justice. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez
rejected the notion that a law which does not respect human dignity would
in every case run afoul of the principles of fundamental justice. Sopinka
J. held:
The principles of fundamental justice cannot be created for the occasion
to reflect the court's dislike or distaste of a particular statute. While the
principles of fundamental justice are concerned with more than process,
reference must be made to principles which are "fundamental" in the sense
that they would have general acceptance among reasonable people. 92
Sopinka J. went on to find that, in the context of physician assisted
suicide, there was no consensus as to what human dignity required in the
circumstances -to end suffering or to prolong life. In the context of
poverty, there may also be disagreement as to the requirements of human
dignity -whether to ameliorate want or to provide a transitional safety
net to the destitute.93 Whatever the minimum level of social assistance
89. See M. Jackman, "Rights and Participation: The Use of the Charter to Supervise the
Regulatory Process" (1995) 4 CJ.A.L.P. 23.
90. See Re: B.C. Motor Vehicles Act, supra note 88; and R. v. Morgentaler, [1988]
IS.C.R.30.
91. Re: B.C. Motor Vehicles Act, ibid.
92. Supra note 86 at 607.
93. As Allan Hutchison has written, "[I]f there were a true consensus of community values,
there would be no need for a Charter of Rights. Judicial review of legal action in terms of its
constitutional validity is unnecessary or unattainable. The fact is that a community consensus
runs out at the very time that it is most needed- in the resolution of disputes that arise because
of a breakdown, gap or shortcoming in the extant body of conventional norms." See
A.Hutchison, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law
School, 1993) at 97.
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that reasonable people may agree upon as necessary for the protection of
human dignity, it is at least plausible that all reasonable people would
insist on some minimum level .94 On this reasoning, substantive funda-
mental justice requires that the state not deprive people of human dignity.
While the Supreme Court has largely restricted substantive fundamental
justice to the criminal context, 95 it is difficult to sustain the argument that
a "free" person facing imprisonment is in more jeopardy than a "depen-
dent" person facing the elimination of public assistance.
b. Welfare Rights Under Section 15
The other provision of the Charter which may be employed in the judicial
review of federal and provincial discretion under the CHST is section 15,
which provides:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The purpose of section 15(1), as with section 7, is to ensure government
acts in a fashion consistent with human dignity.96 The analysis under
s.15(1) involves two steps. 97 First, the claimant must show a denial of
"equal protection" or "equal benefit" of the law, as compared with some
other person. Second, the claimant must show that the denial constitutes
discrimination. At this second stage, in order for discrimination to be
made out, the claimant must show that the denial rests on one of the
grounds enumerated in s.15(1) or an analogous ground and that the
unequal treatment is based on the stereotypical application of presumed
94. On the importance to the Canadian people of the value of compassion as expressed
through social services, see the "Spicer Report," Citizens'Forum on Canada's Future: Report
to the People and Government of Canada (Ottawa: Min. Of Supply and Services, 1991) at 42.
95. Re: B.C. Motor Vehicles Act, supra note 88.
96. See Thibadeau v. Canada, [199512 S.C.R. 627 at 701.
97. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.CJ. No. 29 (QL) at para. 73 [hereinafter Vriend]; Eaton
v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] I S.C.R. 241; Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Benner v. Canada, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.513;Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R.418 at485,492; and Thibadeau,
supra note 96. In Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter
Andrews] and R. v. Turpin, [ 1989] 1 S .C.R. 1296 at 1331-2, the Court emphasized that it is the
substance and not the form of a law that is at issue under s.15, with reference to the larger social,
political and legal context at work on a particular group of people. See also Ontario Human
Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 551.
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group or personal characteristics. The Court has indicated that it is
concerned, however, notjust with stereotypes that are untrue but also with
the true characteristics of a group which "act as headwinds to the
enjoyment of society's benefits and to accommodate them."98 As Sopinka
J. emphasized in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, "The
purpose of s.1 5(1) of the Charter is not only to prevent discrimination by
the attribution of stereotypical characteristics to individuals, but also to
ameliorate the positions of groups within Canadian society who have
suffered disadvantage by exclusion from mainstream society as has been
the case with disabled persons". 9
The CHST provides a potential basis for an equality challenge on three
distinct fronts. First, the CHST may give rise to significantly different
standards of welfare in various provinces (as the risks of increased
welfare loads are offloaded to provinces of vastly disparate fiscal capa-
bilities), thus creating potential inequality on the basis of residency.100
Second, the inclusion of social assistance in the block grant may discrimi-
nate against welfare recipients if they absorb deeper cuts relative to health
and post-secondary education; and third, certain segments of the welfare
population such as women and the disabled may suffer disproportion-
ately harmful consequences by the provincial funding cuts blamed on the
CHST. 101
Because poverty is not an enumerated class under s.15, the threshold
question for any challenge to the CHST on either of the first two possible
grounds would be whether welfare recipients constitute a class analogous
to those enumerated. Generally, whether the poor or some subset thereof
qualifies as an "analogous class" for the purposes of s.15 has yet to be
98. Brant, supra note 97 at paras. 66-67.
99. Ibid.
100. The Supreme Court has left open whether residency may be the basis for an analogous
* class. See Turpin, supra note 97. For an analysis of this case law, see Hogg, supra note 18 at
1192-95.
101. The argument for a challenge to the CHST on the basis of its consequences for women
has been advanced by Martha Jackman in "Women and the CHST," supra note 5.
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definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. There is some support in
lower courts for both sides of this issue.10 2
In Masse, discussed above, all three judges agreed that social assis-
tance recipients were not a discrete and insular minority and therefore not
an analogous class entitled to the protection against discrimination
contained in s.15. The applicants had claimed that the Ontario welfare
cuts imposed a greater burden of reducing the deficit on the backs of
social assistance recipients than on other members of society benefitting
from state services (e.g., users of public health care, public transit or
public education). The judges unanimously held that the welfare cuts did
not constitute a differentiation based on the personal characteristics of
those on public assistance. Corbett J. dissented, however, on the grounds
that while the welfare cuts were constitutional, exempting certain catego-
ries of persons from the cuts (i.e., the elderly and permanently disabled)
on the grounds of unemployability, but not other unemployable groups
(i.e., sole-support mothers of pre-school age children and the temporarily
disabled), did violate s.15.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that poverty constitutes
an "entrenched social phenomenon,"0 3 however, it has also stated that it
is not for the Court to intervene to remedy this phenomenon. 104 Individu-
als, therefore, must find traits other than poverty by which an under-
inclusive benefit may be challenged under section 15. In Sparks,10 5 for
102. For the view that the economically disadvantaged are not an analogous group, see
Gosselin, infra note 121, where Reeves J. concluded that because poverty is a relative state
caused by factors both intrinsic and extrinsic to the individual, the poor are not protected under
s. 15; for the view that the economically disadvantaged are an analogous group, see Federated
Anti-Poverty Groups v. British Columbia (A.G.) (1991), 70 B .C.L.R. (2d) 325 (S.C.) where the
Supreme Court of B.C. refused to strike claim of welfare recipients forced as a condition of
receiving certain assistance to waive rights to other forms of assistance, holding (at 344): "[I]t
is clear that persons receiving income assistance constitute a discrete and insular minority
within the meaning of s.15. It may be reasonably inferred that because recipients of public
assistance generally lack substantial political influence, they comprise 'those groups in society
to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attending.' "As the
legislation in question was later amended, the case never actually came to trial. Additionally,
in Sparks, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the government's provision of legislative
benefits/assistance to single mothers was evidence of their disadvantage: see Dartmouth/
Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks, [ 1993] N.S .J. No. 97 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Sparks]; for other examples of sole support mothers on social assistance being found to merit
protection as a disadvantaged group under s.15, see also R. v. Rehberg (1993), 127 N.S.R. (2d)
331 (S.C.); and Schaff v. The Queen (1993), 18 C.R.R. (2d) 143 at 158 (T.C.C.). See also H.
Orton, "Section 15, Benefits Programs and Other Benefits at Law: The Interpretation of
Section 15 of the Charter since Andrews" (1990) 19 Man. LJ. 288.
103. Per L'Heureux-Dub, Moge v. Moge, [199213 S.C.R. 813 at 853.
104. See Finlay (1993), supra note 36.
105. Supra note 102.
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example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found that public housing
tenants constituted a class analogous to the classes enumerated in s.15.
This is why the third type of Charter challenge to the CHST, alleging an
unequal impact on certain categories of welfare recipients, would appear
to have the greatest chance of success.
"Equality" in the context of economic disadvantage is, of course, a
problematic term. Where people treated unequally by the market ap-
proach the state for assistance, does treating them equally require the
government to give the same to each, thereby reinforcing the inequality
of the market, or does it require providing benefits to the disadvantaged
and thereby reducing their inequality? From social welfare to employ-
ment insurance to old age pensions, the Canadian welfare state intervenes
to redress particular inequities produced by the market while leaving
others alone. How can a court hope to reconcile the polycentric policy
choices Parliament has made? While the Charter may not have been
intended to remedy the socioeconomic inequalities of the market,10 6 it
was intended to supervise how governments respond to these inequali-
ties. A simple answer would be to ensure that, in funding social programs
such as the CHST, the government not discriminate against the poor.
Such an argument has not been precluded under s.15 of the Charter, nor
has it been embraced. A comprehensive consideration of the status of
those dependent on public assistance under s. 15 by the Supreme Court is
overdue.
c. The Search for Welfare Rights in Canada
The failure to entrench "welfare rights" in Canada illustrates the limits of
judicial review as a means of scrutinzing the "flexibility" of governments
in the design and implementation of social policy. The two leading
justifications are that (1) the Charter protects negative liberties (i.e., the
freedom of the individual from state interference), but cannot be used to
enforce impose positive entitlements (i.e., the obligation on the state to
intervene on behalf of the destitute); and (2) the inapplicability of the
Charter to protect property or economic rights.
i. Positive liberties and welfare
The Supreme Court has cast the protections contained in s.7 as negative
rights (the freedomfrom state prohibitions) which are concerned prima-
106. See M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Toronto: Thompson, 1994) at 337-53.
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rily with the physical integrity of individuals subject to intervention by
the state. While the definition of "life" and "liberty" remain to be
adequately explored by the Supreme Court of Canada, "security of the
person" has been the subject of considerable judicial comment. In
Rodriguez, Sopinka J., writing for the majority, described the scope of
this protection as follows:
There is no question, then, that personal autonomy, at least with respect to
the right to make choices concerning one's own body, control over one's
own physical and psychological integrity, and basic human dignity are
encompassed within security of the person, at least to the extent of freedom
from criminal prohibitions which interfere with these."°7
Martha Jackman, among others,has argued that section 7 ought to contain
a positive right under which all Canadians are guaranteed the provision
of adequate shelter, clothing, food and other necessaries of life by the
state:
A Canadian who suffers from basic want is not free. To recognize this
reality, is to recognize that the Charter, by declaring that every Canadian
has a right to life and liberty, imposes an affirmative obligation on the state
to ensure that no Canadian is in need. A failure by the state to meet that
obligation constitutes a denial of fundamental constitutional rights. 08
Courts in Canada have failed to embrace this view of section 7. To the
contrary, courts routinely point out that neither provincial nor federal
governments can be compelled by the Charter to provide social welfare
of any kind.0 9
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that positive govern-
ment steps may be required in order to protect a Charter right. This view
was expressed in Haig v. Canada.!0 In Haig, the Supreme Court was
107. Rodriguez, supra note 86 at 588.
108. Martha Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20
Ottawa L. Rev. 257 at 266. See also J.D. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and
Application of Section 7 of the Charter" (1983), 13 Man. L. 455; and M. Manning, Rights,
Freedoms and the Courts: A Practical Analysis of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1983). For more pessimistic early writings on the scope of constitutional
protection for the poor, see also A.C. Hutchinson, "Charter Litigation and Social Change:
Legal Battles and Social Wars" in R.J. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987).
109. In Masse, for example, O'Driscoll J. reviewed the section 7 jurisprudence relating to
social welfare and concluded, "In my view, s. 7 does not provide the applicants with any legal
right to minimum social assistance... s. 7 does not confer any affirmative right to governmental
aid." Supra note 50 at 42; see also Gosselin, infra note 121, Schaff, supra note 102, and Ontario
Nursing Home Association et al. v. Ontario (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 166 (H.CJ.). For a
discussion of this line of cases, see Howse, supra note 85 at 110.
110. [ 1993] 2 S.C.R. 995. See also Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994]
3 S.C.R. 627 at 655.
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asked to consider whether residency provisions in Quebec's voting laws,
which would prevent a recently established resident of Quebec from
participating in the non-binding referendum on the Charlottetown Ac-
cord, violated the applicant's right to freedom of expression under s.2 of
the Charter. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., writing for the majority, held as
follows:
One must not depart from the context of the purposive approach articulated
by this Court in R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd.,[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. Under
this approach, a situation might arise in which, in order to make a
fundamental freedom meaningful, a posture of restraint would not be
enough, and positive government action might be required. This might
take the form of legislative intervention aimed at preventing certain
conditions which muzzle expression, or ensuring public access to certain
kinds of information. In the proper context, these may perhaps be relevant
considerations leading a court to conclude that positive government action
is required."'
Could social welfare conceivably fall into the category of situations
where a "posture of restraint" by government is insufficient to ensure
compliance with the Charter? In my view, such circumstances exist
where welfare recipients are already dependent on state assistance. The
ability of such individuals and families to live with "human dignity" in
such circumstances arguably is contingent on basic necessities provided
by the state. For this reason, the dichotomies of positive and negative
liberty (and, for that matter, of government "action" and "inaction"),
must be understood differently in the context of social welfare. They
assume the possibility of living outside the realm of state assistance. For
at least a core constituency of welfare recipients, this option does not
exist. When the state reduces or eliminates financial or other commit-
ments to these individuals, their freedom is compromised. Negative
liberty for these people is a perverse freedom-the freedom to lose an
apartment, suffer malnutrition, go without basic necessities and live
without hope.'12
111. Ibid.
112. What is central to this analysis of positive and negative liberty is the context of the
individual or family whose freedom is at stake. As Leon Trakman observed "They [courts]
apply Charter rights according to the normative quality of those rights, not simple the a priori
facts of their existence. A fundamental right, then, hinges upon the need for and want of it, the
ability to exercise it, and the social benefit that derives from it. What is a fundamental freedom
depends upon the history, practice, and expectation of those who are able to invoke it. What
is a justifiable limit upon that freedom hinges upon the level of wealth, education and skill of
those who claim it and are affected by its denial." See L. Trakman, Reasoning With the Charter
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 126.
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Is the repeal of national standards in the transition from CAP to the
CHST a case of the government action or inaction? Plausibly, it is both,
depending on the vantage point from which the legislation is viewed. For
welfare recipients, it is action-removing a tangible and enforceable
obligation on the state; for the government, it is inaction-the absence of
certain conditions on the provinces. The difference of perception (and
perspective), however, is crucial, for government action is subject to
review under the Charter, while government inaction is not." 3
This problem was recently explored in three lower court decisions in
Ontario dealing with the Conservative government's repeal of employ-
ment equity legislation, its partial repeal of pay equity legislation and its
repeal of labour standards protection for agricultural workers. In Ferrell
v. Ontario (A.G.)," 4 Dilks J. considered the constitutionality of the Job
Quotas Repeal Act, 1995, which repealed the Employment Equity Act,
1993. Dilks J. first found that the provincial government was under no
"duty to legislate" in this field. Dilks J. next considered whether, having
legislated in this field, the provincial government was obliged to leave
this legislation in place. He concluded that the Constitution did not fetter
the government from repealing the statute. Indeed, as the legislation at
issue merely repealed the earlier legislation, Dilks J. noted that there was
at issue no "government action" to measure against the Charter.
In Service Employees International Union, Local 204 v. Ontario
(A.G.),"5 O'Leary J. considered the provincial government's repeal of a
portion of the Pay Equity Act, 1990. The repeal related to amendments
made to the Pay Equity Act in 1993, but left the balance of the legislation
intact. In this case, O'Leary J. held that the partial repeal violated section
15 as it discriminated on the basis of gender and could not be saved by
section 1. O'Leary J. observed that, had the provincial government
repealed the legislation in its entirety (as it had done in the case of the
Employment Equity Act) then its action would have been constitutionally
sound. However, by repealing only the portion of the Pay Equity Act
offering protection from discrimination to vulnerable women in low-
wage sectors, the government acted unconstitutionally.
In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General),'16 Sharpe J. dismissed a
challenge to the repeal of the Agricultural Labour Relations Act, 1994.
113. For further discussion of the problematic nature of this distinction, see D. Pothier, "The
Sounds of Silence: Charter Application When the Legislature Declines to Speak" (1996), 7
Constitutional Forum 113.
114. [1997] OJ. No. 2765 (Q.L.) (Gen. Div.). This case is currently under appeal.
115. [1997] OJ. No. 3563 (Q.L.) (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter SEIU, Local 204].
116. (1997), 37 O.R. (3d) 287 (Gen. Div.).
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That Act had ended agricultural workers' exclusion from labour protec-
tions. It was repealed by the newly elected Conservative government in
1995. The applicants sought to strike down the legislation repealing the
Act as contrary to agricultural workers' right to freedom of association
and their equality rights under the Charter. In dismissing the challenge on
its merits, Sharpe J. reiterated the view expressed by Dilks J. in Ferrell,
that what a legislature gives, it may also take away:
In my view, if the Legislature is free to decide whether or not to act in the
first place, it cannot be the case that once it has acted in a manner that
enhances or encourages the exercise of a Charter right, it deprives itself of
the right to change policies and repeal the protective scheme. To hold
otherwise would be to create a broad class of statutes that would enjoy the
status of a constitutional guarantee that would be immune to repeal.
The logic of these recent rulings is unsettling. Where government
removes some state protection, its actions may be reviewed for infringing
the Constitution. However, where the government removes all state
protection, its actions appear to be immune to constitutional challenge.
The Supreme Court has somewhat clarified the action/inaction and
positive/negative rights dichotomies in its recent decision in Vriend v.
Alberta. 17 In Vriend, a teacher was fired from a private school for being
a homosexual. The Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act ("IRPA ")
did not protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Vriend challenged the exclusion of sexual orientation from among the
protected grounds on the basis that it violated s. 15 of the Charter. The trial
judge found the omission of sexual orientation violated the Charter and
ordered that the impugned section of the IRPA be applied as if sexual
orientation were a protected ground. On appeal, the majority of the
Alberta Court of Appeal reversed this ruling. McClung J.A. held that the
Charter could not apply to a legislature's failure to enact a provision.
O'Leary J.A. reached the same result for slightly different reasons. He
concluded that while the Charter applied to the Legislature's decision not
to enact a provision, such silence could not form the basis of a distinction
for the purposes of the s.15 test.
In reversing the Alberta Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court took a
starkly different approach to the issue of the Legislature's silence.
Writing for the majority on this point, Cory J. referred to the distinction
between government action and inaction in the context of a Legislature's
decision not to legislate in a particular area as "very problematic.""' 8 In
117. Supra note 97.
118. Ibid. at para.53.
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rejecting the reasoning of McClung J.A., Cory J. emphasized that "The
notion ofjudicial deference to legislative choices should not, however, be
used to completely immunize certain kinds of legislative decisions from
Charter scrutiny."'1 9
Though not necessary to support the judgment, Cory J. also addressed
whether a Legislature may be subject to a "duty to legislate" under the
Charter:
It has not yet been necessary to decide in other contexts whether the
Charter might impose obligations on the legislatures or Parliament such
that a failure to legislate could be challenged under the Charter. Nonethe-
less, the possibility has been considered and left open in some cases. For
example, in McKinney, Wilson J. made a comment in obiter that "[i]t is not
self-evident to me that government could not be found to be in breach of
the Charter for failing to act" (p. 4 1 2). In Haig v. Canada, [ 1993] 2 S.C.R.
995, at p. 1038, L'Heureux-Dub J., speaking for the majority and relying
on comments made by Dickson C.J. in Reference re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [19871 1 S.C.R. 313, suggested that in
some situations, the Charter might impose affirmative duties on the
government to take positive action. Finally, in Eldridge v. British Colum-
bia (Attorney General), [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, La Forest J., speaking for the
Court, left open the question whether the Charter might oblige the state to
take positive actions (at para. 73). However, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to consider that broad issue in this case.
How would this reasoning bear on a challenge to the CHST? The CHST,
inter alia, repeals CAP in its entirety, but replaces the federal funding
provided under CAP with a new scheme. Some features of the old scheme
are retained (i.e., the residency requirement), while the balance are
removed (i.e., standards relating to basic needs) and others are altered
(i.e., shifting from a contract between provinces and federal government
in which funding was tied to demand to a federal block grant based on per
capita funding). Based on the recent decision in Vriend, the failure of
Parliament to enact national standards relating to the quality of social
welfare assistance would appear to constitute "government action" and
thus to be subject to scrutiny under the Charter. However, Vriend fails to
resolve the uncertainty regarding whether a legislature may be subject to
a duty to legislate (or a duty not to repeal legislation) as a result of the
Charter's application. Judicial review of the CHST would offer an
opportunity to move beyond the action/inaction and positive/negative
right dichotomies to an analysis of Charter rights from the standpoint of
citizens already dependent on the state.
119. Ibid. at para.54.
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ii. Economic rights and welfare
Courts in Canada have held that the Charter does not apply to protect
purely "economic rights";' 20 and therefore that social assistance benefits,
because they are economic in nature, are beyond the scope of the Charter
(this has arisen generally in the context of s.7) .121 The distinction between
economic rights and other forms of rights is not easily sustainable in the
context of the welfare state, where civil, social and economic relation-
ships between state and citizen are often intertwined. The Supreme Court
of Canada has acknowledged, at least in passing, that the exclusion of
"economic rights" from the purview of s.7 in corporate-commercial
settings may not apply in the same manner to social welfare settings. In
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), Chief Justice Dickson offered the
120. See Wilson v. Medical Services Commission ofBritish Columbia (1988),53 D.L.R. (4th)
171 (B.C.C.A.) Wilson considered whether the right to work as a doctor was included in the
meaning of "liberty" under section 7. The B.C. Court of Appeal appeared to distinguish
between the right to work, which was purely economic and not covered by the Charter, and the
right to practice a profession for which one is otherwise qualified, which was covered by the
Charter. In Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123,
Lamer C J., in obiter, appeared to reject this distinction and stated that economic rights, broadly
construed, were not the concern of the Charter. In this sense, Lamer CJ. went on to observe,
section 7 of the Charter may be distinguished from the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. See the discussion of this jurisprudence in Evans, supra note 88 at 54-55.
121. See Masse, supra note 50; also Clark v. Peterborough Utilities Commission (1995), 24
O.R. (3d) 7 (Gen Div.) (in which the Court rejected the claim that the requirement of a deposit
by the utilities commission had an adverse impact on the poor and violated s.7 of the Charter).
Howden J. claimed the applicant was making a "plea for economic assistance" which was
beyond the scope of s.7 (at 29); Conrad v. Halifax (County oJ) (1993), 124 N.S.R. (2d) 251
(S.C.) (plaintiff received municipal social assistance from the County, and as a condition of the
assistance, she was compelled to apply to Family court for a maintenance order against her
abusive husband. Alleged to have cohabitated with her husband after this date, she was taken
off and put back on the rolls and filed suit for damages under ss.7 and 24(1) claiming she was
denied a hearing when her benefits were terminated. In Conrad, Gruchy J. found the claimant
was not credible and that she was ineligible for social assistance, but used broad language with
respect to any social welfare claim being economic in nature and therefore beyond the scope
of s.7. The claimant's lawyers had argued the "security of the person" component of s.7 placed
an affirmative duty on government to provide the means to sustain one's physical and
emotional security. Alternatively, her lawyers argued that once she had been found eligible,
asecurity interest vested in the maintenance of those benefits. The Court rejected both prongs
of this argument.); Gosselin v. Quebec (Procureurginiral), [1992] RJ.Q. 1647 (Q.L.) (C.S.)
(a class action brought under ss.7 and 15 in which a reduction in social assistance to able bodied
adults who did not participate in a workfare program was upheld because s.7 could not apply);
Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing Authority (1989), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190 (C.A.) (in which the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the Public Housing authority had violated
the appellant's right to security of the person by giving her notice to vacate); Fernandes v.
Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central) (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 402 (Man. C.A.) (in
which claimant sought increase in welfare payments to permit him to receive medical care at
home rather than in a hospital. Court dismissed claim holding that the right to a certain standard
of living or way of life could not be protected under s.7).
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following remarks in his discussion of the exclusion of the word "prop-
erty" from s.7:
First, it leads to a general inference that economic rights as generally
encompassed by the term "property" are not within the perimeters of the
s.7 guarantee. This is not to declare, however, that no right with an
economic component can fall within "security of the person." Lower
courts have found that the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a broad
spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various
international covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal
work, adequate food, clothing and shelter, to traditional property ... We
do not, at this moment, choose to pronounce upon whether those economic
rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though
they are of the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights.122
The fact that social assistance involves an economic element, therefore,
should not necessarily be determinative. A wide range of Charter cases
impinge on the economic rights and well-being of litigants and others in
both obvious and subtle ways. As Teresa Scassa has pointed out, "[t]he
fact that welfare payments involve money should not be taken to mean
that they are purely an economic interest .... Denying the application of
s.7 of the Charter in the social welfare context is not a neutral exercise in
constitutional interpretation - it is a choice about whose interests we can
afford the time and energy to protect."'23
The combination of the judicial aversion to what it characterizes as
"positive liberties" and what it characterizes as "economic rights,"
together provides the basis for the denial of anything approaching a right
to welfare in Canada. This approach is illustrated in the reasons of the
Ontario Divisional Court in Masse, in which all three judges held that the
Ontario government's welfare cuts did not violate section 7 of the
Charter.124
In his reasons, O'Brien J. rejected the applicant's argument that the
reduction of welfare benefits pushed recipients of social assistance below
an "irreducible minimum standard" without the benefit of fundamental
justice.12 5 Based on his review of the Canadian case law on s.7, O'Brien
J. concluded that the right to receive social assistance benefits, or the right
to receive a particular level of benefits, were economic rights that fell
outside the ambit of s.7. O'Brien J. adopted Peter Hogg's argument for
judicial reticence in the realm of social policy:
122. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1003-4 [emphasis added].
123. Scassa, supra note 85 at 192.
124. Supra note 50.
125. Ibid. at 56-7.
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[I]t would bring under judicial scrutiny all the elements of the modem
welfare state, including the regulation of trades and professions, the
adequacy of labour standards and bankruptcy laws and, of course, the level
of public expenditures on social programs. As Oliver Wendell Holmes
would have pointed out, these are the issues upon which elections are won
and lost; the judges need a clear mandate to enter that arena, and s.7 does
not provide that clear mandate.1 6
However, this approach is based upon the fallacy that judges have less
political impact when they decline to intervene in social and economic
life than they do intervene. In my view, there is no neutral stance possible
for courts to take with respect to those dependent on the state for
assistance. Every state decision, whether by ajudge, politician or bureau-
crat, has as forceful a human impact on those whose life opportunities
depend on the state.
d. Welfare Rights and Judicial Deference
Throughout the Charter analysis under sections 7 and 15, the common
refrain justifying why no right to welfare should exist in Canada is that
to find otherwise would constitute an improper usurpation of legislative
authority by the judiciary. The dominance of judicial deference in the
field of social welfare is reinforced in the jurisprudence considering
section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 provides:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Based on the analysis of sections 7 and 15 above, it is uncertain that any
challenge to the CHST would reach the stage of section 1. It is nonetheless
worth considering because, unlike other Charter provisions, section 1
appears expressly to require judges to consider the normative purposes of
the impugned legislation. However, rather than viewing this section as a
mandate to develop the limits of government action with reference to
constitutional norms, courts have understood their mandate as one of
determining whether impugned legislation and government action could
or could not be "saved."
The test for "saving" an infringement of a Charter right is well known
and was set down in R. v. Oakes."7 First, the law must be found to have
a "pressing and substantial" objective. Second, the law (i) must be
rationally connected to that objective, (ii) impair the rights as minimally
as possible, and (iii) there must be a proportionality between the good of
126. Ibid. at 58, citing from Hogg, supra note 18, at 1030.
127. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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the objective achieved and the extent to which the rights have been
impaired. Recently, the Supreme Court has "relaxed" the burden on
government to justify Charter infringements in the sphere of social
policy, and emphasized the importance of deference to the legislature
with respect to the crucial "rational connection" and "minimal impair-
ment" prongs of the Oakes test. If a political solution is possible and has
been deemed appropriate, Courts generally will refrain from imposing a
legal one.
The case of Egan v. Canada is instructive in this regard. 28 In that
decision, four justices found that the provisions of the Old Age Security
Act 1 9 excluding same sex couples from spousal benefits violated section
15 of the Charter and could not be saved under section 1. Four justices
found that the impugned provisions did not violate section 15 and that if
it had, it would have been saved under section 1. Sopinka J., writing for
himself alone, carried the "swing" vote. He agreed that the provisions
violated section 15 but that they were saved under section 1. He justified
his holding on the following basis:
It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited funds to
address the needs of all. A judicial approach on this basis would tend to
make a government reluctant to create any new social benefit schemes
because their limits would depend on an accurate prediction of the
outcome of court proceedings under s.15 of the Charter. The problem is
identified by Professor Hogg in Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed.
1992) at pp.9 1 1-12, where he states:
It seems likely that virtually any benefit program could be held to be
under-inclusive in some respect. The effect of Schacter [1990]
2F.C. 129 (C.A.) and Tetrault-Gadoury [19911 2 S.C.R. 22 is to
subject benefit programs to unpredictable potential liabilities. These
decisions by-pass the normal processes by which a government sets
its principles and obtains Parliamentary approval of its estimates.
This Court has recognized that it is legitimate for the government to make
choices between disadvantaged groups and that it must be provided with
some leeway to do so. 3'
128. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
129. R.S.C. 1985,c.O-9,ss.2, 19(1).
130. Egan, supra note 97 at 572-73 [emphasis added]; see also McKinney v. University of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S .C.R. 229, per La Forest J. at 318-19: "But generally, the courts should not
lightly use the Charter to second-guess legislative judgment as to just how quickly it should
proceed in moving forward towards the ideal of equality. The courts should adopt a stance that
encourages legislative advances in the protection of human rights. Some of the steps adopted
may well fall short of perfection, but as earlier mentioned, the recognition of human rights
emerges slowly out of the human condition, and short or incremental steps may at times be a
harbinger of a developing right, a further step in the long journey towards full and ungrudging
recognition of the dignity of the human person."
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The Supreme Court has recently clarified its position on legislative
deference under s.1 in cases such as RJR.-Macdonald, Eldridge and
Vriend.'31 This attempt to strike the proper balance under s.1 of the
Charter was summarized by Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, in
Vriend:
[A]lthough this Court has recognized that the Legislature ought to be
accorded some leeway when making choices between competing social
concerns ... judicial deference is not without limits. In Eldridge, supra,
La Forest J. quoted with approval from his reasons in Titrault-Gadoury v.
Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [ 1991] 2 S.C.R. 22
at p.42, wherein he stated that "the deference that will be accorded to
government when legislating in these matters does not give them an
unrestricted license to disregard an individual's Charter rights." This
position was echoed by McLachlin J. in RJI.R.-Macdonald, supra, at
para.136:
[C]are must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far.
Deference must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of
the burden which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the
limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable.
Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to social
problems within the limiting framework of the Constitution. But the
Courts also have a role: to determine, objectively and impartially, whether
Parliament's choice falls within the limiting framework of the Constitu-
tion. The Courts are no more permitted to abdicate their responsibility
than is Parliament. To carry judicial deference to the point of accepting
Parliament's view simply on the basis that the problem is serious and the
solution is difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in the
constitutional process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which
our constitution and our nation was founded.132
It is difficult to predict how the Court would view judicial deference in
the context of the CHST. In Vriend, Iacobucci J. distinguished the
deferential approach adopted by Sopinka J. in Egan partially on the basis
of the financial consequences to the government of striking down the
impugned legislation in that case, which were not present in Vriend. This
would seem to suggest the Court would adopt a more deferential posture
where financial obligations were involved. However, it would seem
contrary to the purposes of the Charter, and an "abdication of responsi-
bility" for the Courts to immunize violations of Charter rights simply
because the government was motivated by financial concerns. If a
government decides it cannot afford to comply with sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter, it may always invoke section 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982
131. See for further discussion, M. Jackman,"Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy:
Judicial Review Under Section 1 of the Charter" (1996), 34 Osgoode Hall LJ. 661.
132. Vriend, supra note 97 at para.126 [emphasis added].
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(the "notwithstanding clause") to override any judicial finding of uncon-
stitutionality. 33
III. Welfare Rights Outside the Charter:
Section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982
A further sources for constitutional norms relating to national standards
and social welfare is section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which
provides:
(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or -ofthe
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the
exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures,
together with the Government of Canada and the provincial governments,
are committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians:
(b) furthering economic development to reducing disparity in opportuni-
ties; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Cana-
dians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.'34
The conventional view that this provision is non-justiciable has now
been subject to persuasive challenge. In "Providing Essential Services:
Canada's Constitutional Commitment under Section 36", Aymen Nader
argues that s. 36 imposes a constitutional obligation on governments with
respect to how they discharge their spending powers.'35 While this may
not be enforceable in terms of requiring the government to penalize
provinces whose welfare policies failed to meet certain standards, it could
appropriately be the subject of a declaration by the Court regarding the
proper action by the government in the circumstances.13 6
According to Nader, s. 36 sets out obligations by which both federal
and provincial governments must abide in relation to the CHST:
Provincial responsibility pursuant to s. 36(l)(c), then, would entail the
exercise of provincial legislative authority to establish and regulate health,
education and welfare programs in the province. It is also incumbent on the
133. See Hogg, supra note 18 at ch. 36.
134. Supra note 84.
135. A. Nader, "Providing Essential Services: Canada's Constitutional Commitment under
Section 36" (1997) 19 Dalhousie L.J. 306.
136. lbid.at351.
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provinces to guarantee legislatively that these programs be of a "reason-
able quality", as per s.36(1)(c). The actual qualitative standard, however,
would not be solely supervised by the provinces. A minimum standard
must be determined by the federal government based on criteria contained
in conditional grant programs because only the federal government can set
standards which would apply nationally. In other words, provinces would
be financially penalized if they delivered services which failed to meet
federally set national standards .... The content of the federal commitment
under s. 36(1)(c) requires somewhat more from Parliament and the federal
government than that which is expected from the provincial legislatures.
As already noted, the federal government is also implicated in the commit-
ment to providing essential public services "of reasonable quality ..
[Tlhe provision of essentialpublic services of "reasonable quality" to "all
Canadians" will require the federal government to place, as a condition
for the receipt of federal grant monies, the stipulation that provincial
programs meet a standard of comprehensiveness and intrinsic adequacy.
This standard of comprehensiveness will be the minimum by which
provinces must abide in order for them to meet their commitment of
providing essential public services of "reasonable quality .137
Because the CHST does not require that the provinces provide social
welfare services of "reasonable quality", the CHST would appear to be
inconsistent with s. 36 of the Constitution. 38
It would be difficult to sustain a challenge to the CHST on the basis of
s. 36 of the Constitution alone.13 9 This skepticism is based on the
preamble to s. 36, which makes it clear that it is not intended to alter "the
legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the
rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative
authority." Clearly, obligating the federal government to supervise
provincial welfare programs to ensure they are of "reasonable quality"
would alter the exercise of the federal government's legislative authority
in relation to the CHST. Further, the preamble makes clear that the federal
and provincial governments are "committed" to the goals set out in the
section, not bound to achieve those goals. A "commitment" can be
expressed in many ways. The provision of the CHST providing a
mechanism to develop shared principles arguably could satisfy the
federal government's "commitment" for these purposes. Finally, while
there is no more essential service from the perspective of social welfare
137. Ibid. at 358-60. [emphasis added]
138. Jackman reaches a similar conclusion in "Women and the CHST," supra note 5 at
392-93.
139. I am aware of no litigation that has been successfully mounted against the federal
government on this basis.
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recipients, it is far from clear that social welfare would be held to
constitute an "essential service" for the purposes of this provision.
Welfare is not a universal program like old age pensions, nor is it
necessary for the well-being of all citizens, like police and fire services.
Indeed, the very fact that the federal government has provided a block
grant to the provinces and not required them to spend any portion on
welfare, nor attached any substantive standards to welfare, all suggest
that welfare would not qualify as an "essential" service.
Although, for the reasons stated above, I do not believe s.36 could
sustain a challenge to the CHST, I would argue this provision does
constitute an important statement of Canada's constitutional norms
relating to its welfare state. The welfare state is concerned not only with
the equitable provision of social programs to all Canadians irrespective
of the province or region in which they live, but also with the quality of
those programs. It is the absence of this latter commitment that marks the
distance between the CHST and the substantive foundation of the welfare
state.
IV. International Welfare Rights
Canada's international commitments relating to social and economic
rights are another source of the substantive foundation of Canada's
welfare state. Canada is a signatory nation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which calls on all governments
to ensure an "adequate standard of living" for their citizens.1" While
member states "undertake" to take steps to realize the rights set out in the
covenant, there is no binding mechanism to enforce compliance. In
addition, the U.N. Charter obligates all member governments to promote
"higher standards of living" and "conditions of social and economic
progress." Finally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
by the U.N. and supported by Canada, guarantees the right to an adequate
standard of living including food, clothing, shelter, health and welfare.
When the CHST was proposed, and domestic lobbying proved fruit-
less, poverty advocates took their case to the international community.
Following submissions from the National Anti-Poverty Organization,
the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the National Action
Committee on the Status of Women, the U.N. Committee on Economic,
140. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46. For a fuller argument on the connection between international
obligations and federal cost-sharing of social welfare, see Scott, supra note 5.
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Social and Cultural Rights unanimously decided to send a letter to the
federal government warning that the CHST legislation could violate
international human rights treaties to which Canada has been a signatory
since 1976.141 As with administrative law and Charter concerns, it was
not only the failure of Canada's social programs funding legislation to
enact standards that created the violation but the fact that existing
standards were being repealed. In other words, the CHST was not simply
inadequate but regressive.
This international initiative appeared not to have a significant impact
on the federal government. Further, the international treaties Canada has
signed and the commitments contained therein are unlikely to form the
basis of a challenge to the CHST in Canadian courts. It is arguably the
provincial governments who have the primary responsibility to imple-
ment these international agreements as the provinces have the legislative
jurisdiction to design and implement social welfare programs. While it is
reasonable to suggest that the federal government's exercise of its
spending power should be circumscribed by its own international com-
mitments, this would be difficult if not impossible to enforce. It is clear,
however, that these international commitments form a part of the core
norms of the Canadian welfare state.
Thus far in this analysis, all the norms found in administrative law, the
Charter and international agreements appear to militate for national
standards and welfare entitlements. It would be simplistic and inaccurate
to conclude that the Canadian welfare state does not contain normative
strands in the other direction. Surely, the acceptance of welfare cuts in
provinces such as Ontario and Alberta and the absence of significant
grassroots opposition to the CHST itself suggest otherwise. In fact, the
Canadian welfare state has been characterized by a deep ambivalence
towards its mission from the outset. The present patchwork of means-
tested, social insurance based and universal programs which comprise
Canada's welfare state is testament to its diversity and complexity. The
view that social welfare is the cause of poverty and dependence rather
than its consequence is no longer a voice heard only from the neo-
conservative fringes. In fact, perhaps the single greatest influence on the
Canadian welfare state has come from the American welfare state, which
recently has taken concrete measures to remove all entitlements to
ongoing social assistance from its federal welfare funding as part of a
hugely popular campaign "to end welfare as we know it." It is for this
reason that the American experience with "welfare rights" is instructive.
141. The letter and its implications are discussed in detail in Scott, ibid at 79-80.
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V. The Rise and Fall of Welfare Rights:
Lessons from the American Experience
It is no coincidence that the CHST emerged at the very moment that the
Republican Congress and President Clinton agreed to "end welfare as we
know it" and enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of1996.142 As with the CHST, while this appears as
a measure intended to promote flexibility for welfare program design in
the states, its greatest impact will be on the recipients of social welfare.
A brief description of the American shift from cost-sharing to block
funding may shed light on the future of the CHST and its impact on the
Canadian welfare state.
Despite the generally accepted view that Canada's social welfare
policy is more "generous" than that of the U.S., these two countries have
long travelled a roughly parallel path in the development of welfare state
programs. 143 Both Canada and the U.S. inherited the English legacy of the
Poor Laws, and an ambivalence to the provision of state assistance to
those in need.'I" Both countries share a political culture characterized by
liberalism and individual rights that viewed poverty as primarily a result
of poor work ethics not social conditions or business cycles. 145 Both first
experimented with national social welfare with the introduction of
mother's aid and veteran's pensions to those deemed "worthy" in the
early twentieth century. 146 Both countries attempted to create a minimal,
142. Public L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (August 22, 1996).
143. See P. Collins, "American-Canadian Welfare: Parallel Journeys through Dead-Ends,
Debts and Detours! Lessons from the North" (1993) 11 Wisc. Int'l L.J. 445; C. Watson,
"Machiavelli and the Politics of Welfare, National Health, and Old Age: A Comparative
Perspective on the Policies of the U.S. and Canada" (1993) Utah L. Rev. 1337; R.M. Blank &
M.J. Hanratty, "Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S." in SmallDifferences
That Matter, eds., D.Card & R.B. Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993);
D. Fraser & A. Freeman, "What's Hockey Got to Do With It, Anyway? Comparative
Canadian-American Perspectives on Constitutional Law and Rights" (1987) 36 Buffalo
L. Rev. 259; R. Kurdle & T. Marmor, "The Development of the Welfare State in North
America" in P. Flora & A. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe
andAmerica (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981) 81; C. Leman, The Collapse of Welfare
Reform: Political Institutions, Policy and the Poor in Canada and the United States (Cam-
bridge: M.I.T. Press, 1980). See also, generally, S. Lipset, ContinentalDivide: The Values and
Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).
144. See S. Webb & B. Webb, English Poor Law History (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,
1963).
145. See G. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds ofWelfare Capitalism (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity
Press, 1990) at 50-54.
146. On Canada, see The Emergence of SocialSecurity in Canada, supra note 26. On the U.S.,
see T. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the
United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 30-38; and L. Gordon, Pitied but
Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: Free Press,
1994) at 37.
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national system of state intervention to ameliorate poverty in response to
the Great Depression of the 1930s, and governments in each country had
to overcome constitutional opposition from its Supreme Court to institute
such a system. 147 A sharp increase in social welfare benefits occurred in
both countries in the 1960s. Under the banner of President Johnson's
"Great Society," and Prime Minister Trudeau's "Just Society," new
programs such as medicaid, medicare and food stamps in the U.S. and
CAP in Canada were intended to transform welfare benefits from
discretionary privileges to legal entitlements.
There was one important distinction, however, in how the two jurisdic-
tions understood the rationale for those welfare entitlements. In Canada,
welfare primarily has been approached as the public expression of a social
bond. This bond was given legislative form in the Canada Assistance
Plan. An important feature of this bond as a national symbol is its
distinctiveness from the American welfare model. As Andrew Armitage
has observed in his discussion of the future of social welfare,"The liberal
vision continues to draw its strength from the pride that Canadians have
in building a social order in North America that is safer and more just than
that of the United States." 4 ' The argument for a substantive right to social
assistance in Canada is rooted in the view that Canada's political culture
is amenable to state involvement in social and economic life. 14 9 Canadi-
147. See W.H. McConnell, "Some Comparisons of the Roosevelt and Bennet 'New Deals'"
(1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 221.
148. A. Armitage, Social Welfare in Canada Revisited: Facing up to the Future, 3rd ed.
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 184-85.
149. According to Charles Taylor, "Canadians ... see their political society as more
committed to collective provision, over against an American society that gives greater weight
to individual initiative .... There are regional differences in Canada, but generally Canadians
are proud and happy with their social programs, especially health insurance, and find the
relative absence of these in the U.S. disturbing." See C. Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values"
in R. Watts & D. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1991) 53 at 56. George Grant, for example, viewed this as one of the principal tenets of
political culture shared by both the English and the French populations in Canada. G. Grant,
Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965) at 68-9. Allan Moscovitch has
gone further, claiming that the collective obligations in Canada to provide for the welfare of
all constitute the essence of Canada's identity as a nation. See A. Moscovitch, "The Rise and
Decline of the Canadian Welfare State" Perceptions (November-December, 1982) 28. This
commitment, moreover, is inviolable, despite the neoconservative assault on the welfare
state's legitimacy in the 1980s. See for a discussion, K. Banting, The Welfare State and
Canadian Federalism (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1987) at 185. Observ-
ers argued that this is because social welfare programs had become "embedded" in Canadian
society, and had become sacred cows to business, labour, bureaucrats and social activists. See
A. Cairns, "The Embedded State: State-Society Relations in Canada" in K. Banting, ed., State
and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986) 53 at 55-58.
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ans, on this view, are more preoccupied with government's failure to
adequately address its citizens' needs than are Americans who accept the
state's more limited role in social well-being. 5 ° In Canada, social
programs additionally have served as a tool to shore up the weakening
links of federalism. According to Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, "In
Canada, the welfare state has not only had the task of preserving stability
in the face of potential class tensions, but also the task of fostering
national integration in a regionalized society of continental extent.' ' 51
In the U.S., by contrast, welfare was not understood as a social bond
but as an extension of individual rights. This view was reflected in the rise
of the "New Property" movement in the 1960s, 52 popularized by Charles
Reich in his 1964 article of the same name. 153 Reich argued that welfare
entitlements were not a privilege which could be granted or taken away
with impunity, but rather a form of property, like land and other forms of
"old property," which could not be interfered with or expropriated from
its owners without due process. By this conceptual leap, welfare rights
activists sought to transform the receipt of public assistance from an
150. Jackman elaborates:
While governmental programs designed to guarantee adequate levels of health,
housing, unemployment security, and social assistance clearly have an economic
dimension, entitlements to such programs are not perceived in our society solely in
economic terms. Rather, in the Canadian social welfare tradition, such entitlements
are viewed as integral to and reflective of values which are profoundly social in
nature-values which define the relationship between individual, community and
state. These include the ideas that Canada is an interdependent community; that
individual Canadians are not the sole guarantors of their own social and economic
well-being; and that there is a minimum level of welfare below which no Canadian
will be allowed to fall.
"Poor Rights," supra note 85 at 78-9. See also R. A. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental
Rights" (1982) 27 McGill LJ. 755 at 773.
151. A. Cairns & C. Williams, "Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada: An
Overview" in A. Cairns & C. Williams, Research Coordinators, Constitutionalism, Citizenship
and Society in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 17.
152. This movement developed as a response to dissatisfaction with the manner in which
discretionary authority under social assistance statutes was being exercised. See M. Davis,
Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993) at 122-3. For a discussion of the interplay between welfare rights and
discretion, see M. Sosin, "Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-80" in S. Danziger & D.
Weinberg, eds., Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't (Cambridge: Harvard
Univesity Press, 1986); R. Rabin, "The Administrative State and its Excesses: Reflections on
the New Property" (1990) 24 U.S.F. L. Rev. 273 at 360.
153. See Charles Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733. Reich wrote,
"Inequalities lie deep in the administrative structure of government largess. The whole process
of acquiring it and keeping it favours some applicants and recipients over others. The
administrative process is characterized by uncertainty, delay, and inordinate expense; to
operate within it requires considerable know-how." See also C. Reich, "Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues" (1965) 74 Yale LJ. 1245.
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arbitrary act of political generosity to a constitutionally protected right
enjoyed and enforceable by any person receiving social assistance. 5 4
Victories for welfare advocates in the U.S. came in a number of
important fields in the 1970s, mostly dealing with the process of estab-
lishing eligibility for welfare benefit. The rise of welfare rights, however,
led to unintended consequences that were ultimately harmful to welfare
recipients.155 While the formal, procedural guarantees achieved as a
result of the welfare rights movement contributed to the empowerment of
welfare recipients in their interaction with the state, it came at the expense
of increased dependency of the poor on increasingly rule-bound and "red-
tape" filled bureaucracies .156 The spectre of this dependency on public
assistance and the failure of recipients to escape grinding poverty,
moreover, made an "end to welfare" not only conceivable but desirable
across a wide swath of the U.S. electorate. The focus on the entitlement
to welfare deflected attention from the inadequacy of welfare benefits and
the punitive features of the bureaucracy administering those benefits) 5 7
For this reason, the sufficiency of welfare benefits to allow individuals
and families actually to escape poverty was overshadowed by the alleged
causal link between entitlements on the one hand and dependency on the
other.
The result of the shift in the discourse on welfare in the U.S., with its
emphasis away from entitlement and dependency on the state and
154. The source of "welfare rights" in the U.S. was traced to the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which provides that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," and the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits the States from
infringing such interests without due process. The Supreme Court of the United States relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) [hereinafter
Goldberg], in requiring that a hearing be provided a recipient of welfare whose benefits were
going to be terminated. In justifying this decision, however, Justice Brennan took special pains
to reject the traditional jurisprudential stance in the U.S. that welfare was a privilege and not
a right, declaring (at 262) that welfare benefits "are a matter of statutory entitlement" and later,
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care ....
Thus ... termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks
independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate
upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek
redress from the welfare bureaucracy."
155. The notion of assistance as an entitlement implicitly legitimates the status quo of social
welfare programs. If a single mother is "entitled" to assistance well-below the poverty line, her
ability to enforce these inadequate benefits becomes a hollow right. The "welfare rights"
movement was handicapped by its assumption that the state, rather than the market,represented
the greatest threat to the poor. See W. Simon, "The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights" (1985) 44 Md. L.R. 1.
156. See M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (New York: Sage, 1980) at 140-151.
157. See L. Sossin, "The Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes on the
Possibilities and Limits ofBureaucratic Engagement"(1996) 22N.Y.U.Rev.Law & Soc.Change 623.
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towards the market and individual responsibility, has been the erosion of
the idea of welfare as "New Property" and the due process rights which
flowed from this premise. 58 The substantive limits placed on the states
under the Personal Responsibility Act are all designed to reduce recipi-
ents' dependency on the state and preclude any national entitlement to
welfare.
159
What is the lesson for Canada in the American experience with welfare
reform? Block funding does not merely enhance flexibility, per se, it
introduces greater likelihood of achieving particular purposes which
might otherwise not be permitted. In the U.S., it would appear the
flexibility is enhanced in order to move people off welfare and into the
market economy. Joel Handler describes the current American model in
these terms:
The proposed abandonment of the European and Canadian welfare state is
surely dismaying. These welfare states, with their generosity and inclu-
siveness, represent collectively one of the crowning achievements of the
twentieth century. To follow the American lead is not only dismaying, but
also puzzling. The American statistics are familiar. While millions ofjobs
have been created, they are, for the most part, low-wage, contingent, part-
time, and with low or no benefits. As a consequence, the United States is
experiencing unprecedented wage inequality and persistent poverty, espe-
cially among vulnerable groups. 60
158. In his article, "The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?" (1996) 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 1973, Richard Pierce Jr. contends that American courts are poised to return to the pre-
Goldberg jurisprudence on due process rights for welfare recipients; and R. Epstein, "No New
Property" and W. Simon, "The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration"
in "The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A 20 Year Perspective" (1990) 56 Brooklyn L. Rev. 747
and 777, respectively. See also R. Zietlow, "Two Wrongs Don't Add up to Rights: The
Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures" (1996)
45 Am. U.L. Rev. 1111. Zeitlow argues that passage of the Personal Responsibility Act will
dramatically curtail due process rights for welfare recipients (at 1126-27).
159. As in Canada, the "quid pro quo" for the federal government, in return for promoting
flexibility, is a cap on its welfare contributions for the next five years. Further, to ensure that
the cycle of dependency and entitlement is broken,this grant of flexibility to the states is limited
by the federal condition that recipients "engage in work" within 24 months of receiving
benefits, and that no welfare benefits extend beyond five years. See Personal Responsibility
Act, supra note 142, s.402(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). States are permitted to exempt only 20% of the
welfare population from these conditions, resulting in a new and invidious competition among
welfare recipient constituencies for access to coveted exemptions. See, for example,R.Swarns,
"Welfare Family Advocates, Once Allies, Become Rivals" The New York Times (29 March
1997) 1. The law further provides financial incentives for states that reduce out-of-wedlock
births, and penalties for states whose employment rate for former welfare recipients does not
increase annually: ibid. at s.403(a)(2) and 407(a).
160. J. Handler, "Welfare Reform in the United States" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ. 289 at
290-91; see also J.F. Handler & Y. Hasenfeld, We the PoorPeople: Work, Poverty, and Welfare
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
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The Personal Responsibility Act is explicit in its goal to reshape the
content of social welfare legislation at the state level, while ostensibly
enhancing the flexibility of the states to design social programs to fit their
diverse needs. I would argue the CHST may send a similar, if less explicit,
message to the provinces regarding the deterioration of the quality of
social welfare programs and the elimination of welfare entitlements. How
else can one explain the choice to make the residency requirement a
greater priority in the CHST than poverty or need, while at the same time
preserving the national standards accompanying federal funding for
health care?
If Canada is not to continue down the same path as the Americans with
block funding and welfare reform, it is imperative to anchor the increased
flexibility of the CHST to clear and unshifting national norms. At the
same time, however, there is good cause to be wary of indiscriminately
transforming social bonds into individual rights. With these concerns in
mind, the Canadian welfare state must chart its own course through these
conflicting tendencies. This requires that the Canada's welfare state
programs must be re-anchored to the common ground on which our legal
and political system has been constructed. While Parliament and the
provincial legislatures have the responsibility for sorting through the
Canadian electorate's ambivalence towards welfare programs and wel-
fare recipients, the Courts should assume the responsibility for ensuring
the fundamental tenets of our legal and political system are not compro-
mised in the process. In my view, the courts' narrow and restrictive
approach to this critical task threatens to impoverish judicial review and
leave the Canadian welfare state rudderless in uncertain seas.
Conclusion
Having considered the judicial review of the CHST from a broad range
of perspectives, some difficult conclusions must be faced. To those
concerned that the CHST has resulted in the loss of fundamental aspects
of the welfare state,judicial review would appear to provide cold comfort.
Judicial review cannot substitute standards where Parliament has seen fit
to take them away. In short,judicial review cannot make the CHST into
something that it is not. What judicial review may accomplish, however,
is to affirm that some core elements of the welfare state are inviolable. Our
legal system imposes a variety of duties on governments which they
cannot exempt themselves from through legislation or executive ac-
tion - the duty to act in good faith is one example, respecting democratic
rights is another. Is there a similar sine qua non with respect to social
welfare?
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As alluded to in the introduction, there is both a positive and a
normative answer to this question. The positive answer would appear to
be that there are not judicially enforceable obligations on the federal
government to facilitate minimum entitlements to social welfare through
the exercise of the spending power. The normative answer is that such
obligations are essential, for without them, the welfare state is rendered
contingent and defeasible.
In my view, the substantive foundation of the welfare state (from
which the national standards contained in CAP emerged as well as the
aborted agreement on a social contract in the Charlottetown Accord)
begins from a shared commitment that no one dependent on the state in
Canada should be denied the basic requirements of food, shelter, cloth-
ing, education, social services, health care and other basic necessities of
life. While there may be both valid and invalid reasons to see individuals
and families "get off' welfare, the purpose of welfare ultimately must be
to ensure that all citizens live with a minimum of human dignity. A social
welfare program such as the CHST, which deprives all Canadians of this
guarantee arguably cannot be consistent with human dignity. It is for this
reason I contend the CHST could jeopardize the substantive foundation
of the Canadian welfare state. Thus, the CHST represents Canada's
version of an "end to welfare as we have known it." The CHST fails to
articulate a vision of social welfare compatible with human dignity to
replace the one contained in CAP.
The vision the CHST does articulate relates to the future of Canadian
federalism. However, while many would agree that the provinces should
and have become the driving force behind the welfare state, the CHST
appears to take cognizance of this in an inconsistent and incoherent
fashion. While national standards are removed from social welfare, they
are retained for health care. However, if flexibility is the goal, why
continue to constrain provincial decision-making in one area of social
policy but not another? Furthermore, why remove the substantive stan-
dards relating to welfare which were quite vague and left significant room
for flexibility (as evidenced by the disparities in welfare programs across
the provinces) while leaving in place the residency requirement for
welfare (which leaves the provinces no flexibility)? The choices Parlia-
ment has made disclose a selective approach to "flexibility" and, at least
as far as social welfare recipients are concerned, one which reinforces
their vulnerability.
While Parliament can (and perhaps should) expand the flexibility of
the provinces to design new approaches to welfare, this should not
preclude the courts from meaningfully participating in the clarification of
the federal government's obligations under the welfare state. The goal of
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judicial review of the CHST is not for the judiciary to restore to welfare
recipients the national entitlement to social assistance contained in CAP,
but hopefully to serve as a catalyst to impel the federal government to
define its commitment to some basic standards in the realm of social
welfare. 6' It is in this sense that judicial review has the potential to
salvage the Canadian welfare state. This "dialogue" between the courts
and the legislatures on important social and economic questions is a
beneficial feature of Canada's legal and political system.'62
Based on the cursory analysis of administrative and constitutional law
set out above, I would like to suggest certain shared principles and
objectives already exist in Canada's legal system capable or providing
normative guidance to government action taken under the CHST. These
include, but would not be limited to the following:
(1) CHST funds directed towards social programs should be disbursed in
a manner consistent with the purpose of responding to those in need.
While administrative law principles do not permit a Court to substitute
its own view for the wisdom or efficacy of a law, they do require a Court
to inquire into the purposes of an impugned law and ensure that the law
is being applied in a fashion consistent with those purposes. The condi-
tional aspect of the CHST with respect to social welfare prohibits
residency requirements in the provision of social assistance programs.
Social assistance programs, in turn, are defined as aid to or in respect of
those in need. While indirect, the presence of the term "aid to. .. those
in need" in the definition of social assistance suggests the federal
government has retained at least implicit standards in its funding of
provincially administered social assistance programs. If a purpose of the
CHST is to fund social assistance programs which aid those in need, than
those programs which can be shown not to aid those in need should not
be eligible for the CHST funds.
161. Judicial review served a similar role in the income tax reform context after the decision
in Thibadeau, supra note 96. As Howse concluded following a discussion of this case, "Even
where they may stop short of finding a set of self-standing social rights in existing Charter
guarantees, the courts- in applying core constitutional norms of autonomy and equality to the
social sphere-may have a not insignificant impact on a system that is already in evolution
. . . Charter litigation may therefore provide an important informational or "signalling"
function for policy reformers in government." Howse, supra note 85 at 102.
162. See P. Hogg & A. Bushell,"The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 75.
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(2) CHST funds should only be disbursed to provinces whose social
assistance programs ensure that welfare recipients live with human
dignity.
Both section 7 and 15 of the Charter emphasize the primacy of human
dignity in the protection of fundamental freedoms. A government dis-
bursing funds to be spent on programs to aid those in need, which is
indifferent as to whether those programs respect or erode human dignity,
offends Canada's most basic constitutional norm.
(3) CHST funds should be disbursed with respect for equality between
provinces, and spent by the provinces with an equitable distribution
of funds apportioned between health care, postsecondary education
and social welfare and in a manner that does not discriminate against
any recipient groups.
Section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, establishes regional equality
as another constitutional norm in Canada. This provision represents
constitutional recognition of the value of national standards in social
programs. Further, section 15 of the Charter confirms that the ideal of
"providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadi-
ans" also means that one recipient group should not be discriminated
against based on their vulnerability or marginalization from the main-
stream of social, economic or political life.
(4) Welfare recipients should have standing to enforce these principles
and objectives.
If the government is to remain accountable for its funding decisions,
welfare recipients must remain vigilant in scrutinizing those decisions.
Welfare recipients are unlikely to be a formidable force in the electoral
process. The Courts remain the last resort for the protection of their
interests. As the Supreme Court confirmed in Finlay, no group is more
affected by the federal government's spending power in the sphere of
social welfare than recipients of welfare.
These may not constitute existing, judicially enforceable obligations,
but together, they do represent a modest starting point for the project of
re-anchoring federal social funding to the common ground and shared
aspirations that characterize Canada's welfare state. They could form the
basis of tangible obligations and duties on the part of government to
ensure these norms are respected in the design and implementation of
social welfare policies. They are consistent both with section 36 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and with Canada's international commitments
regarding the protection and promotion of social rights. While these do
not amount to "national standards," they do recognize that the federal
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government's spending power must be differently viewed when it affects
those already dependent on the state.
These norms are consistent with the framework advanced by Courchene,
the leading commentator on the CHST. In his influential essay on the
CHST entitled ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and
Social Systems, Courchene suggests twelve "framework axioms" in-
tended to guide the development of social policy. 163 With these axioms
in mind, Courchene advances an "interim ACCESS" model which would
retain the status quo currently in place with the CHST (i.e., the residency
requirement). The "full ACCESS" model would invest the provinces
with responsibility for the design and delivery of social assistance but
within the context of an enforceable, interprovincial accord committing
the provinces to certain principles and standards. In the social welfare
context, these principles and standards would require, among other
things, that social programs be accessible to and protect Canadians in
need, and promote the well-being of children and families."6
While Courchene's ACCESS model would ultimately see national
standards restored to the CHST as part of Canada's new social and
economic union, these standards would remain to be developed and
enforced through an interprovincial accord. The notion that the provinces
could, working together, adopt a national vision of a shared social union
has been characterized as Courchene's "heroic assumption."'65 As critics
of ACCESS point out, there is little evidence that the provinces have
either the will or sufficient incentives to voluntarily fetter their discretion
in the social policy realm in this fashion.166 Indeed, the recent provincial
initiative to lobby the federal government to increase CHST funding is
163. These are: accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity, citizen rights, the principles
of subsidiarity (i.e. delegation of power to lowest level of government), the federal principle
(i.e. provinces must be free to experiment with their own vision of socioeconomic programs),
the spending power provision (i.e. federal government must retain flexibility as well, uniform
application, duality and asymmetry, non-discrimination and standstill provisions (i.e. preven-
tion of backtracking or "slippage"). See ACCESS, supra note 1 at 7-11. For a commentary on
this proposal, see the proceedings of a conference held on Courchene's proposals entitled
Assessing ACCESS: Towards a New Social Union (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, 1997).
164. See ACCESS supra note 1 at Table 3.
165. S. Kennet,"Securing the Social Union: A Commentary on the Decentralized Approach"
(Canadian Institute of Resource Law, January 7, 1997) at 16.
166. Ibid. at 17-34. See also C. Cohn, "The Canada Health and Social Transfer: Transferring
Resources or Moral Authority Between Levels of Government?" in P. Fafard & D. Brown,eds.,
Canada: The State of the Federation 1996 (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations,
1996) 181.
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notable for its silence on national standards .167 Michael Mendelson of the
Caledon Institute for Social Policy observed that while the provinces are
interested in restoring social policy funding to the levels it reached under
CAP, there is no interest in the conditions that once attached to this
funding. 68 While the debate over the future of fiscal federalism will
determine the ultimate division of responsibility for "national standards"
under the CHST, it is clear to even the CHST's supporters such as
Courchene, that funding social welfare should not remain divorced from
the purposes of providing social welfare. There appears to be a consensus
that federalism alone cannot provide the vision essential to the welfare
state. For this reason, even an interim model under which the CHST
subsidizes the provinces' social welfare programs, without regard to the
quality of those programs, is unacceptable. Welfare recipients, caught in
the middle, suffer the most.
Judicial review represents a partial and preliminary forum in which to
subject fiscal federalism to heightened public scrutiny and to refocus the
Canadian welfare state with respect to its normative purposes. Former
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wrote that "[tihere are areas in which even
the courts cannot provide enlightenment: no matter how clear one's
rights, the federal system must ultimately rest upon a basis of collabora-
tion." 69 This is undoubtedly true. However, for collaboration to work, all
parties must know what is on the table for negotiation and what cannot be
delegated or compromised. In the final analysis, courts should establish
the scope of what is not up for discussion. Canada's federal system is now
inextricably linked with Canada's welfare state. There are elements of
both systems that, absent some new constitutional change, must remain
non-negotiable. Minimal protections for those unable to survive without
state assistance, in my view, should represent one such element of the
welfare state.
Subjecting the CHST to judicial review may not lead to short term
solutions. However, it may shift some of the public spotlight away from
deference, decentralization and devolution and towards the issues of
need, poverty and the purposes of the welfare state. Judicial review is not
an optimal instrument with which to establish and enforce the bottom line
of the Canadian welfare state and thereby salvage its future; it may,
however, serve as a viable and necessary departure point for this end.
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